Sublime Politics: The Political Thought of Dostoevsky by Rulle, Michael Steven
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
1975 
Sublime Politics: The Political Thought of Dostoevsky 
Michael Steven Rulle 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rulle, Michael Steven, "Sublime Politics: The Political Thought of Dostoevsky" (1975). Dissertations, 
Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539624907. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-ca3q-a607 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
SUBLIME POLITICS: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT
t\
OF DOSTOEVSKY
A Thesis 
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of Government 
The College of XTIlliairi and Mary in Virginia
In Partia1 Fulfi11ment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts
by
Michael Steven Rulle Jr.
APPROVAL SHEET
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
\AsyLojLs$ .
Author
Appr ove d , May 1975
Roger W. Smith
Jap de Weydenthai
Margaret Hamilton
ii
•^>ii 4% f’P  /v p.o <2 y 6 0 0
FOR MY PARENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........ . ........ ... .................vi
ABSTRACT............................................... vii
INTRODUCTION ,...   . . 2
CHAPTER I. . , NECESSITY. OF . GOD . AND . IMMORTALITY...........   10
Atheism and Suicide 10
Atheism and Nihilistic Egoism 18
Atheism and Idolatry 23
CHAPTER II NECESSITY OF THE SUBLIME VISION.......   31
• Life "Affirmation and the Necessity of God 32
Sublime World View 36
How to Attain to the Sublime World View 40
The Need to be Responsible "For All and 
Everything” 48
CHAPTER III RADICAL HUMILITY AND CHRISTIAN BROTHERHOOD... 55
The Personal Acceptance of Guilt for All 
of Mankind's Sins as a Means to the 
Ideal Christian Order 55
Coercive Power of the Ideal Christian Order 67 
Proper Attitude toward the Present Political 
Order 74.
CHAPTER IV REJECTION OF VIOLENCE AS A MEANS TO THE IDEAL
CHRISTIAN ORDER..........    83
Christian Means as Christian Ends 83
Ivan's Rebellion 92.
Violence and Self Defense 98
CHAPTER V RUSSIA; THE HISTORICAL SAVIOR   . . . 105
Five Themes from the Diary of a Writer 105
Nationalism and The Possessed 113
One Final Theme From the Diary 116
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
CONCLUSION.............. ......... ................ 124
BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................... 13 5
v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author wishes to express his appreciation to 
Professor Roger W. Smith, under whose guidance this thesis 
was written, for his careful reading and criticism of the 
manuscript. The author also wants to thank his wife, 
Dorinda, for her aid in typing and helpful criticism.
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to explicate'Dostoevsky's 
ideas on man’s political problems by exploring his concep­
tion of truth, both as a world view and as a proper mode 
of being. It intends to show that Dostoevsky believed that 
a society as a whole would never genuinely improve until 
all men within that society learned to live as true Chris­
tians. He believed the political order to be completely 
dependent upon both the world view men adopt and their 
attitude in relation to that world view (i.e., mode of being) 
and felt that only through man’s existential awareness, of 
this proper Christian attitude and world view, and not 
through violent and coercive means, could there ever be a 
true moral revolution. The thesis concludes by showing 
that Dostoevsky’s nationalism reflected his belief that 
Russia would be the world historical vehicle for this 
final Christian revolution.
MICHAEL STEVEN RULLE JR.
DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT 
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY IN VIRGINIA
SUBLIME POLITICS: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT
OF DOSTOEVSKY
INTRODUCTION
Thus we have the eastern ideal-first 
the spiritual communion of mankind in 
Jesus Christ, and thereafter, in conse­
quence of the spiritual unity of all 
men in Christ and as an unchallenged 
deduction therefrom--a just state and 
social communion.
1
Writing a thesis on the•political thought of Dostoevsky 
is a different type of assignment than writing one on the 
thought of most political writers. The primary difference 
is that Dostoevsky was not, nor did he attempt to be, a 
systematic political thinker. All of his writings are in 
the form of articles, short stories and novels, and as a 
result are difficult to collate into one comprehensive form. 
Consequently, many different (though not necessarily incon­
gruous) interpretations can be derived from his works with 
virtually equal justification. In fact, before the English 
translation of his Diary of a Writer, it was not uncommon 
to read certain authors, who considered Dostoevsky to be the 
great atheist. The point is that since Dostoevsky did not 
leave us an explicit comprehensive system of thought in his 
writings, it has been left up to his commentators to supply 
this comprehensive system. There is no one absolute right
2
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way of interpreting Dostoevsky and the commentator must ac­
cept the fact that he is only interpreting his thought, al­
though there are 'certain parameters within which he must 
remain if he is still to be considered a valid interpreter.
It is with this spirit that this thesis is conceived. Also, 
the author does not by any means claim complete (or even 
partial) originality, though he does feel he is presenting 
a particular point of view which is at least as valid as 
most.
In writing on the political thought of any thinker, 
and especially when that thinker is as unsystematic as 
Dostoevsky, one must ask oneself the basic question of what 
in actuality constitutes political thinking. Whether .or 
not a particular thinker is defined as a political thinker 
depends on the breadth of one's definition of the word poli­
tical. If that which is considered political were narrowly 
confined to that subject matter which deals with the proper 
functioning and mechanics of constitutional government or 
with the measurable causal factors which lead to the break­
down (or dysfunction) of a political system etc., then Dos­
toevsky could be called many things, but a political thinker 
would not be one of them. But if one assumes (as this author 
does and as Dostoevsky did) that political problems are 
essentially the normative problems of how men ultimately 
should live together and the nature of ultimate truth, then 
Dostoevsky was a political thinker par excellence.
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What must always be kept In mind is that Dostoevsky did 
not conceive of himself as either a political or a religious 
thinker, at least in the sense that politics is somehow separ­
ated from religion. For him the substance of politics was 
the ethical attitude (i.e., mode of being) that one must as­
sume in light of the ultimate truth (i.e., the objective na­
ture of the world outside of one’s attitude toward it).
Since the problems of the proper ethical attitude and the 
proper world view were essentially religious in nature, one 
could say that for Dostoevsky the problems of politics were 
essentially the problems of religion. As we tan see from 
the opening quote, Dostoevsky did not conceive of the possi­
bility of there ever being a political solution or ideal 
which could be divorced from religion. It is not that re­
ligion was merely prior to politics, it is that the problem 
of politics was defined in an essentially religious manner. 
Actually this is not very difficult to accept once we consi­
der that his religious ideal was a free Christian brotherhood 
of man, one not unlike other political social Ideals (Rousseau 
comes to mind) except that his was essentially Christian in 
nature. His unification of politics with religion is also 
more readily accepted once we realize what it means to refer 
to Dostoevsky as an absolutist thinker. For him there was 
one proper spirit or mode of being for all men in all types 
of endeavors. One could not live with the Christian spirit 
with one’s friends and at the same time be a so-called 
"realist" when taking part in the activities of the political 
(in this sense public) arena. He did not view life as
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compartmentalized in such a way, but rather he perceived 
life as a unified whole, with one proper mode of being, in 
light of one single absolute truth. Once man comes to a pro­
per spiritual awareness, all his traditional political prob­
lems will disappear "as an unchallenged deduction therefrom." 
War, poverty, and man's general inhumanity to man would no 
longer be problems because all men would be filled with the 
spirit of Christian agape. In fact, he envisioned that the 
state as we know it would eventually disappear once mankind 
as a whole came to a realization of the truth. Therefore, 
the study of politics for Dostoevsky is above-all the study 
of human consciousness and spirit, for the world will never 
change until all men individually change.
Actually, Dostoevsky was not alone in believing the 
foundation of politics to be essentially religious in nature. 
His earliest mentor and the leading socialist of his time,
V. G. Belinskii, viewed politics in the same absolutist 
fashion, although he took a completely opposite stance from 
Dostoevsky. His first assumption as a revolutionary was that
all transcendence must be denied. In other words, the cri-
3
tique of religion was the presupposition of all critiques.
Political thinkers thought in very absolutist ways in Dos-
\
toevsky's time, one’s world view had to be established, and 
a first assumption had to be laid down as unassailable. For 
Dostoevsky this first assumption (from which any and all 
hope for a moral order on earth derived) was a faith in a 
transcendent/immanent loving God. For Belinskii, and vir­
tually all other "socialist" thinkers of the time, the first
6.
assumption was a faith in the denial of any transcendent form. 
From these two first assumptions can come very different ideas 
as to the solution for the problems of the world, and it is 
with these ideas that Dostoevsky spent the major portion of 
his adult life.
As mentioned, Dostoevsky, as a novelist and journalist, 
did not have aspirations to create one large comprehensive 
system of thought. Because of this, he left us with some 
apparent inconsistencies in his thinking and as a result he 
left us without answers (or with contradictory answers) to 
some vital political questions. Sometimes problems can be 
solved by inference, but other times these inferences just 
lead to further contradiction. Probably the most infamous 
of his incongruities was his bellicose war stance (as pre­
sented in the Diary of a Writer) combined with the ideal of 
radical Christian humility as idealized in the Brothers 
Karamazov.
But just because there is no one comprehensive system 
of thought presented by Dostoevsky, it does not mean there 
is not a wealth of political ideas that can be derived from 
his writings which are both consistent and intelligible. He 
definitely saw things in a particular light and he offered 
up his view as a solution to man's political and religious 
problems. What this thesis will try to do is to explicate 
Dostoevsky's conception of truth, both as a world view and 
as a proper mode of being. It will also show how Dostoevsky 
believed that from a proper world view, and from a proper
7.
attitude in relation to that world view, (i.e., mode of being) 
comes the type of political and social order considered to 
be ideal. This thesis will also include a discussion of 
those means which are and are not acceptable in the estab­
lishment of the ideal social order and a discussion of Dos­
toevsky's ideas on Russia as the historical vehicle for the 
realization of that ideal. Chapter One will primarily dis­
cuss Dostoevsky's ideas on the necessity of God for any moral 
order. If He does not exist in fact (and in the hearts of 
men) then a meaningless and valueless world exists in His 
place, one headed only for ignorance and death. Chapter Two 
will discuss the glorious world view that can be sustained 
if one has a living faith in God, and the means (though 
possibly ambiguously put forth by Dostoevsky) by which one 
can attain to such a view by "Christianizing1’ one's being 
through continual redemption for all sins of all men.
Chapter Three will concern itself with Dostoevsky's ideas on 
the attainment of universal brotherhood through an individual 
radical Christian humility (i.e., personal continual redemption 
for all sins of all men) and the nature of such a brotherhood 
once it has been established. Chapter Four will discuss 
Dostoevsky's rejection of violence as a proper means to a 
final Christian brotherhood, and Chapter Five will deal with 
Dostoevsky's belief in Russia as the messianic nation which 
will, by example, bring this new universal brotherhood to the 
world. The thesis will primarily be explicative rather than 
critical, except where explication becomes hindered due to
inconsistencies in Dostoevsky’s thought. This happens 
primarily in Chapters Three and Four but also in Chapter 
Five. In virtually all cases these inconsistencies involve 
his belief in the place of violence in a Christian mode of
9.
NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION
1
Fyodor Dostoevsky, Diary of a Writer, trans. by Boris Brasol 
(New York: G. Braziller, 1954), p. 728.
2
J. Middleton Murry, Fyodor Dostoevsky (New York: Russell
and Russell, 1966), This book is most typical of this belief.
3
Ellis Sandoz, Political Apocalypse (Baton Rouge: L.S.U. Press,
1971), p. 19.
CHAPTER I
THE NECESSITY OF GOD AND IMMORTALITY
Here at last we have attained the height 
of the problem Dostoevsky dealt with. The 
question of God is the question of all his 
works: God, the root of all life, and the
basis of the world...,the enigmatically 
unreal in all that is real, the unearthly, 
toward which all that is earthly aspires.
1
...free thought and science will lead them 
to such straits and will bring them face to 
face with such marvels and insoluble mysteries, 
that some of them, the fierce and rebellious, 
will destroy themselves, others, the rebellious 
but weak, will destroy one another, while the 
rest, weak and unhappy will crawl fawning to 
our feet...
2
Atheism and Suicide
Dostoevsky's foremost assumption was his acceptance
of the idea that there could be no belief in the meaning
of morality without a corresponding belief in a loving
God and the immortality of the human consciousness. If
God did not exist, but was merely a phantom in the minds
of men, then the primary attribute of existence would be
its meaninglessness. Dostoevsky was an extremist thinker
and for him there could only exist either absolute value
3
or absolute void. He did not believe in the viability or 
inherent worth of a more vague moral middle ground. For 
him there was no such thing as an authentic experience of
10
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morality, given an atheistic assumption. Those who believed 
otherwise were considered to be pathetically naive.^ He was 
virtually compelled to accept God and immortality a priori 
before accepting life and the world.^ Since he assumed all 
morality and meaning had to stem from God, he also assumed 
that an authentic atheist would perceive no meaning or 
morality in the universe. Therefore, the difference in 
world view between the authentic atheist and the man of true 
faith was not that great. Both accepted God as absolutely 
necessary if man is to have any meaning, but the atheist did 
not accept the idea that He actually exists. Hence, it is 
easy to see why Dostoevsky was able to express powerful 
nihilistic ideas as well as religious ones.
God, therefore, becomes absolutely essential for 
Dostoevsky in the creation of the ideal community of men.
No final moral order could ever be established without the 
acceptance of God, for without Him there could never be a 
moral foundation. This chapter will attempt to show that 
Dostoevsky, because of his radical stance, believed that the 
absence of a faith in the living God could only lead to sui­
cide or nihilistic egoism on the individual level, and to 
the nants nest11 and/or a power-perverted idolatry on the 
societal level.
Dostoevsky’s ideas on suicide were unique, to say the 
least. For him it was a foregone conclusion that anyone who 
accepted the fact of personal death, given a Godless universe, 
would eventually commit suicide if they followed such an
1 2 .
experience to its ultimate conclusion. The major strength 
of Dostoevsky's dialectic concerning this idea is its exis­
tential persuasiveness rather than its logical necessity.
His argument was a highly subjective one (which he admitted) 
and was based on the acceptance of experiential assumptions 
which not all men would consider valid. What follows is a 
short summary of Dostoevsky's argument concerning the neces­
sity of suicide in a Godless world.
Without faith in God and the immortality of one's soul, 
"man's existence is unnatural, unthinkable, impossible.*"^
In the experience of the realization of one's ultimate finite 
nature, one comes to the inevitable conclusion that man's 
existence on earth is an unendurable and utter absurdity.
One's existence becomes flooded with the feeling of aimless­
ness and boredom, with suicide offering the only escape.
The characters Svidrigalov, Smerdyakov and Stavrogin are em­
bodiments of this idea. They are the "aware" atheists who 
realize "that only those men can consent to live who resem­
ble the lower animals and who come nearest to the latter by 
reason of the limited development * of their minds and their 
purely carnal w a n t s . A  belief in the mortality of the 
human soul inevitably leads towards indifference "for every­
thing that generates and nourishes life, that brings health,
O
that annihilates decomposition and fetidness."0
Neither individuals nor body politics are able to live 
without a sublime idea and to Dostoevsky there was but one 
sublime idea from which all others are derived--that immortal­
ity is granted to mankind from an infinite and loving God.
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Therefore, the "aware" atheist is not capable of being 
happy because he has denied the truth of that which is the 
source of the true experience of the sublime in existence. 
Without the sublime idea, man's life is seen as disgusting, 
abnormal and insufficient.
According to Dostoevsky, the "aware" atheist may at 
first attempt to deny this fact by accepting his own suf­
fering and by ardently seeking some form of conciliation.
The usual way this is manifested is the attempt by the 
atheist to serve mankind through the moral impetus of 
"love for mankind.” This is a magnanimous thought and one 
full of suffering, but soon the atheist becomes frustrated, 
for such a man Is inevitably drawn to the irresistible con­
viction that "the life of mankind--just as his own--is, sub­
stantially, a fleeting moment, and that on the morrow of the 
realization of 'harmony' (if one is to believe this dream
can be realized) mankind will be reduced to the same zero 
9eve^i as he.” Once the atheist realizes this fact, his be­
lief in the meaning of "love for mankind" loses it urgency.
The comprehension of "no matter what happens, man will die 
anyway" at first stirs his love of mankind, that is,he desires 
justice for mankind as a whole in spite of death. But soon 
this existential rebellion turns into contempt. It does 
so because the "aware" atheistic man eventually must accept 
the fact that ultimately he is impotent in the face of man’s 
suffering, i.e., he cannot forestall death forever. Man is 
not spiritually capable of continually loving man in full
14.
realization of his suffering. As his suffering becomes more 
intolerable, his ability to sustain love becomes more diffi­
cult because it becomes too painful. The realization of 
one’s utter impotence in bringing alleviation to suffering 
mankind, Dostoevsky asserts, "may convert in one1s heart 
love for mankind into a hatred of it. " ^  In other words, 
genuine love of mankind is "altogether impossible without 
the accompanying faith in the immortality of man's soul.
Love of mankind without a corresponding faith in God and 
immortality is only the seed for a future hatred.
Without faith in God and immortality, man's ties with 
the earth become severed. He no longer can find any reason 
to support the meaning of its existence. Following from this, 
the Dostoevskian argument states that suicide becomes an 
inevitable necessity for any man who "by his mental develop­
ment has even slightly lifted himself above the level of 
cattle.
As we can see, the importance of faith in God and im­
mortality outweighed the importance of reason for Dostoevsky. 
Faith in God is prior to even the'acceptance of life itself. 
With faith, in spite of the apparent contradiction, the 
experience of the truth of one's immortality actually ties 
man all the more strongly to earth. Faith in one's infinite 
life brings man to a comprehension of the full meaning of his 
destination here on earth. Without faith in his immortality, 
man divorces himself from the earth through the denial of its 
meaning, and this subsequent loss of the sublime felt at
15.
least in the form of unconscious anguish, inevitably leads 
to suicide. As we know, Dostoevsky supported this belief 
in his novels through the creation of many suicidal char­
acters, though probably the most representative of these 
is Stavrogin in The Possessed:
The citizen of the Canton of TJri was dangling 
just by the door. On the table there was a 
scrap of paper with the words "accuse no one,
I did it myself11... The strong silk cord with 
which Nikolai Stavrogin had hanged himself was 
lavishly smeared with soap. After the autopsy, 
all our medical experts rejected any possibility 
of insanity.
13
The political implications of Dostoevsky’s ideas 
about suicide were meant to be damaging to all atheistic 
political groups of his era. What Dostoevsky implied was 
that, without a belief in God and immortality, there could 
be no moral community of conscious men, i.e., there could be 
no authentic atheistic moral community. Any political move­
ment which begins with the denial of the existence of God 
(and therefore immortality), as virtually all socialist 
movements of his era did, is immediately seen to be made 
up of men of displaced awareness, men who have not even 
perceived the true nature of their own philosophical and 
religious stance. Dostoevsky’s suicide thesis implies that 
the atheist, rather than haying an existential awareness- of 
what it means to say one’s death is final, has instead made 
the idea of atheism something to be believed in itself. Vir­
tually all of the atheist-socialists in the novel The Possessed,
16 .
outside of Verkhovensky and Stavrogin, reflect this
Dostoevskian perception. Instead of experiencing the dread
and emptiness that accompanies the realization of one’s.
finite nature, the naive atheist-socialist has instead filled
that void by making atheism a foundation for political ideas
14which take on religious characteristics to the believers.
The truly ’’aware” atheist will not find meaning in atheism, 
as Dostoevsky criticized the socialists for doing, but 
from the anguish of this understanding will subsequently 
commit suicide.
Generally speaking, the Russian socialist of Dostoevsky’s 
time believed that the belief in God was a chain which needed 
to be broken before Russia could become a just and progres­
sive society. Dostoevsky, on the other hand, believed that 
once faith in God was destroyed, the resulting experience 
made one realize that there is no solution to man's suffering 
once you assume a consciousness above the unconscious pur­
suit of survival, pleasure, and the act of procreation. Of 
course, the assumption here is that life has meaning and 
worth only in so far as there is a moral plane that exists 
independently of the material world. But if there is no 
God, there is no ultimate morality; therefore, there is no 
meaningful solution to man's suffering on earth without Him. 
Because the atheist-socialist did not seem concerned with 
this issue, and because they did not view death in the same 
dreadful, nihilistic manner as did Dostoevsky, he accused 
them of naivete and claimed their social goal was not a
17.
social harmony based on the idea of the beautiful and moral* 
but an ants nest based only on scientific reason.^ Since 
Dostoevsky put forth the theory that man's anguish over 
death (both of self and of man in general) turns our love 
for man into contempt, anyone who would be capable of 
understanding the true nature of a higher moral order would 
also realize that in the absence of faith in God, such a 
high moral order becomes an impossibility.
Of course, this argument is a circular one; if one 
truly believes there is no God, one will not believe, ac­
cording to Dostoevsky, in a higher moral order. If one is 
an atheist and believes in a higher moral order, he must be 
naive. He is naive because anyone who truly knows there is. 
no God will also know there is no higher order. But, again, 
Dostoevsky’s persuasiveness is not in his reason or logic, 
but in his presentation of a world view. Once one accepts 
the validity of his world view, one realizes that what ap­
pears like circular reasoning is actually explaining an 
existential phenomenon. Ultimately it is a matter of faith. 
If one founds all his moral beliefs on an existential faith 
in God, Dostoevsky's argument does become more than just a 
diatribe against atheists. Rather, it takes on a profun-
i
dity of its own, given the acceptance of certain assumptions.
From Dostoevsky's viewpoint, the atheist's feverish 
struggle for the creation of a new harmonious order was one 
based on an incomplete understanding of the meaning of life. 
To him they not only did not have the true faith, they did
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not even know what it meant not to have it. If they had 
understood they would have then realized that such a new 
harmony, if it were to be a true harmony of conscious men, 
could only be founded on the belief in God or realize that 
the pursuit of such a society would be futile, since ulti­
mately ’’all men will be reduced to the same zero.” He con­
cluded that the atheist-socialists were not men who were 
pursuing a harmony based on the brotherhood of man in light 
of a higher knowledge, but were in fact unconsciously pur­
suing a "harmony" built only on the principles of the ants 
nest and utilitarian survival. Simply put, Dostoevsky be­
lieved that a true love for man could not be sustained in 
the face of eternal annihilation.
Atheism and Nihilistic Egoism 
In spite of the suicidal inevitability that Dostoevsky 
seems to be expounding in his interpretation of a true under­
standing of atheism, there also exists in his works a dif­
ferent type of destructive reaction to the belief in no God. 
Rather than self destruction based on the experience of an­
guish, there is a tendency for some of his atheistic char­
acters to live their life in the criminal pursuit of self 
interest. Dostoevsky taught that a Godless world meant
16there was no limit at all to man's nihilistic "freedom'.1 
In other words, we are confronted with the idea that without 
God "all is permitted."
19.
Two of the more interesting figures who embody this 
idea in Dostoevsky’s works, and who cannot be characterized 
as naive atheistic idealists, are Raskolnikov in Crime and 
Punishment and Peter Verkhcvensky in The Possessed. Rather 
than moving in the direction of suicide, or in the direction 
of what Dostoevsky would consider a naive attempt at a God­
less moral order,.they instead moved in the direction of a 
nihilistic pursuit of power. The personal reasonings (or 
lack of reasonings) behind their respective actions may have 
been different, but the basic message is the same in both 
of their characterizations. If there is no God, then no 
one has final say outside of the self. There is no ulti­
mate purpose in any action outside of what the self makes 
of it. In action, Raskolnikov and Verkhovensky were two 
examples, or logical precursors, of Ivan’s final "unifica­
tion" of the nihilistic principle in his assertion that 
"all is permitted."
Raskolnikov was a young student who became fascinated 
with the idea that there was a certain elite of human beings 
throughout history, who through their special understanding 
were able to rise above the normal and petty moral order.
These men were not bound in spirit by that which bound 
other men. They were free tp act in the pursuit of their 
own desires without the pangs of guilt or remorse which 
prevented lesser men from rising above the herd. The man 
who could do this was an extraordinary man. The extra-
ordinary man was a man who
...has every right to commit any wrong or
crime... laws, so to say, are not made for
men such as them.
17
It was this kind of man Raskolnikov emulated and 
fancied himself becoming. He set out to prove that he too 
was above the law and with this thought in mind he planned
and executed the double ax murder of an old woman landlord
and her half-witted sister. Raskolnikov, of course, failed 
in his attempt at becoming a Napoleonic man. For a myriad 
of psychological reasons that Dostoevsky masterfully por­
trays, Raskolnikov falls far short of his projected goal. 
But that is less important, for purposes of explicating 
Dostoevsky’s political thought in comparison with the signi 
ficance of the conception of the idea in the first place.
One of the points Dostoevsky was trying to make was 
that in the absence of a living faith in God, man becomes 
spiritually isolated from his fellow man. In this spiri­
tual isolation man becomes deadened to the significance 
of human life. As a result, given a certain kind of per­
sonality, such an isolation can lead to any kind of des-
*
truction, including destruction which is seen as serving 
the interests of the self. Translated into political 
action, we have the so-called Napoleonic principle in which 
man, in the egoistic pursuit of power over other men will 
stop short at no atrocity to achieve his given end.
2 1 .
But Dostoevsky is not only saying that man is capable 
of this type of action in the absence of a living faith, but 
is also saying that if there were no God, then such actions 
could only be capriciously condemned, i.e., there would be 
no ultimate moral reason for condemning such actions as 
wrong. For Dostoevsky this is part of the reason God is so 
necessary for man; for without Him, there is no basis for 
order outside of utilitarian principles, and such a condi­
tion would make men little better than the beasts.
Verkhovensky, though obviously a more shallow person­
ality type than Raskolnikov, is also acting from similar 
assumptions, though for himself they are largely unconscious. 
He is the political activist whom Raskolnikov's Napoleonic 
principle foreshadows; he is the political man in action 
with no scruples. Though normally conceived of by critics 
as a Dostoevskian diatribe against revolutionaries,it is 
more proper to view him as a Dostoevskian embodiment of the 
nihilistic principle. Dostoevsky himself noted that Verk­
hovensky was not really patterned after any particular 
revolutionary but was created around the fact of a political 
murder by the terrorist Nechaev. Dostoevsky had read about 
the murder and thought the act so significant that he 
created the character of Verkhovensky in light of his own 
ideas on atheism and nihilism. In other words, Verkhovensky 
is not meant to be representative of the typical revolu­
tionary (i.e., an idealist who hopes to create a new utopia 
either through violent or non-violent means) but is, from
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Dostoevsky's framework, another example of what is possible 
in a Godless world, a possibility against which one has no 
moral defense.
It is clear that Dostoevsky did not consider all revo­
lutionaries to be nihilists and to portray Verkhovensky as 
a Dostoevskian stereotype of all revolutionaries would be 
unfair.^ In. fact, Dostoevsky did have an acute awareness 
of the moral nature of many young radicals and he expresses
IQ
this opinion in an early article of the Diary. He felt 
these young men had an ultimate moral concern, even if he 
simultaneously felt them to be extremely misguided. Dos­
toevsky was actually critical of those who wished merely to 
silence them and have them quietly return to their studies 
in the universities. Their moral concern was commendable, 
but their ideas were inverted.
Verkhovensky, on the other hand, was not committed to
any moral idea. His purpose in creating havoc was to secure
power for himself and if he could not secure power, he was
content to create havoc just the same. Born unwanted and
left virtually deserted by his liberal Westernizing father,
Stepan Trofomovitch, Verkhovensky seemed bent on getting
back at a world which made him an alien in his own country.
Unlike Lenin, he was not a man willing to sacrifice "three
20quarters of mankind" for a great historical goal, although 
he would have been willing to do so for his own gain. Al­
though his tactics may not have been contrary to revolution­
ary tactics (i.e., causing the breakdown of the unwanted
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system of order through any means possible), in his parti­
cular case they were not intended to serve idealist ends.
He even stunned Stavrogin with his admission that he was 
not a socialist at all, but a rogue whose only desire was 
to exercise his will. Verkhovensky was supposed to be less
i
a portrayal of the Russian revolutionary than he was to be 
a symbol of what is "permitted" in a Godless world, an em­
bodiment of atheistic implications. He shows that without 
God there is moral anarchy, and because of this a society 
which has begun to lose contact with God dwells in the midst 
of a potential powder keg.
Atheism and Idolatry
And as man cannot bear to be without the 
miraculous, he will create new miracles 
of his own, and will worship deeds of 
sorcery and witchcraft.
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For Dostoevsky, the moral and social structure of tra­
ditional Western society was founded on an existential re­
lationship with God. If such a society loses or disowns its 
faith (and Dostoevsky saw both happening in his age) it is 
left suspended and without direction. Man is not capable 
of enduring such a moral 'vacuum and he psychologically seeks 
to escape the terror of this nothingness through the frantic 
search for a new order. Since Dostoevsky believed there 
could be no true order without a direct relationship with 
the living God, he leaves us to infer from his works that 
without God man is faced with either accepting the anarchy
of nihilism or the retreat into a totalitarian and idola­
trous inode of existence in which a new order is defined for 
him.
The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor is, among other 
things, a symbolic representation of the psychological 
state of a society which has lost contact with God. The 
Inquisitor, from Dostoevsky’s point of view, not only blinds 
man to the reality of God, but for man’s own good, also 
blinds him to the reality of the implications of a Godless 
world. He prevents any existential realization of the 
foundationless moral ground of his social order in order to 
protect man from the dreadful effects of such a realization.
The Possessed also presents a similar psychological 
image of man in a Godless world. Man is seen as unable to 
endure a moral vacuum for any length of time. He searches 
for a new role, a subordinate position within a newly 
created order. Verkhovensky expresses this idea to Stavro- 
gin when discussing the latter's future role as "the Prince 
who is in hiding." Of course, Verkhovensky1s hope is that 
this new order will be centered around the idolatrous wor­
ship o f ’the Prince." The Prince will step in to fill the 
vacuum of nothingness and the people will be glad to accept 
him as their leader in order to be free from the anguish and 
terror of nothingness.
...there'll be havoc everywhere--havoc such 
as the world has never before witnessed.
Russia will be shrouded in mist and the earth 
will weep for its old gods--and it's then we 
shall use...the fairy-tale prince...We shall
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say he is in hiding...Oh what a marvelous 
legend we could let loose on them. The 
main point is that a new authority is 
coming and that's just what they'll be 
longing and crying for. What use can 
we have for socialism? It destroys the 
old authority without replacing it. But 
we will have authority--
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In other words, man, without a true relationship with 
the living God, seeks another authority in order to escape 
from his position of disarray. In a Godless world there 
is either moral and social anarchy, or idolatry. Although 
idolatry is only a sublimated form of moral anarcly, man 
would rather choose idolatry than live in an orderless 
universe.
Dostoevsky believed that once man denied the reality 
of the living God, he must also repress the implications of 
such an admittance if he is to live in peace. If he fails 
to do so and if he fails to create a counter order to re­
place the God-centered one, then anarchy will continue to 
prevail. In The Possessed Dostoevsky portrays just such 
a situation. There were suicides, murders, and general mass 
confusion; chaos occurred, riots and killings were everyday 
happenings, and the irrational search for scapegoats be­
came commonplace. Life became a nightmare, or as the poli­
tical philosophers politely call it, a state of nature.
Once God is denied, man's potentiality for a truly 
meaningful existence is also denied. It becomes necessary 
for man to create an idolatrous counter order in the midst 
of nothingness, something which will both satisfy his need
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for meaning and stem the tide of the violence of anarchy, 
for even without God man needs some kind of unifying symbol 
just for survival's sake. As in The Grand Inquisitor, the 
false symbol can even be referred to as "God.” In The 
Possessed the great plan called for the deification of 
Stavrogin. In both stories the "saviors" were pretenders 
who nevertheless were to save man from a floundering exis­
tence .
With the creation of such a pretender (which need not 
be just an individual, i.e., it could be a state or system 
of ideas, etc.), man must accept as truth what in reality is 
an absurdity or he would again face the utter confusion and 
emptiness of existence. From Dostoevsky’s viewpoint, either 
way man ultimately loses. The only way man could transcend 
this dilemma would be through an existential relationship 
with the true and living God. If such a relationship were 
not possible, that is, if God did not actually exist, then 
there could be no true salvation for mankind. God is 
necessary for man's salvation. In other words, if God did 
not exist, man would be living in an intrinsically meaning­
less and hopeless universe in which his only alternatives 
would be suicide, nihilistic egoism or idolatry.
Keeping Dostoevsky's idea of the necessity of God in 
mind, it becomes easy to see why he believed an awareness 
of "true" atheism to be "next-to-the-top rung of the ladder 
of perfect faith.' The authentic atheist, according to 
Dostoevsky, differs from the man of true faith only in that
he does not believe that God actually exists. But he shares 
the man of faith's world view that He is absolutely neces­
sary if man is to truly live a meaningful, moral, and holy 
existence. For Dostoevsky, true atheism was not a form of 
belief, nor a counter faith in secular forms of politics;
rather, it was a form of ultimate concern without any 
24content. Belief is only "an act of knowledge that has
a low degree of evidence, " while true atheism is an atti-
25tudinal stance of a total personality. Belief or disbe­
lief in any given Idea does not necessarily imply ultimate 
concern, yet it is this stance of ultimate concern in a 
meaningless universe which Dostoevsky characterized as 
"true" atheism. Neither was "true" atheism the type prac­
ticed by most of the socialists and Westerners of his era. 
They created a secular (and therefore idolatrous) goal as 
their object of ultimate concern. They found meaning in 
that which Dostoevsky thought was intrinsically meaningless, 
and he believed they did not understand the implications of 
their own atheistic stance. Atheism, on the other hand, is 
absolute negative faith in God. That is, a "true" atheist 
believes ultimate meaning can only be derived from a God 
he is convinced does not exist. Therefore, "true" atheism, 
or negative faith, was the closest thing to true faith, for 
it was a form of ultimate concern about God, a "standing be­
fore" but without any God to "stand before."
In its most extreme form Dostoevsky believed the only 
true response to the acceptance of the fact of atheism would
lead to suicide, while only a repressed (and therefore 
limited) form of consciousness could consent to live with­
out God. Given his belief that only a higher moral order 
can bring meaning into the world, and given the fact that 
only God can give that moral foundation, the "aware" athe­
ist chooses death as the only alternative. On the other 
hand, those who are divorced from the living God without 
comprehending its true implications will choose either ego 
ism or some form of totalitarian and idolatrous worship.
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CHAPTER II 
NECESSITY OF THE SUBLIME AWARENESS
Sin Is smog, and the smog will disappear 
when the sun rises in its power. Sin is a 
transitory matter, but Christ is eternal.
1
In the last chapter we discussed some nihilistic 
possibilities which can develop in the absence of a faith 
in the living God. This chapter will attempt to explicate 
the joyous life affirmation one can experience once one 
establishes a faith in God. It is through the sublime aware­
ness that man will find a love for life, and in that love a 
solution to his problems. This understanding is the corner­
stone on which Dostoevsky1s ideal universal solidarity is 
based. This chapter will attempt to do four things. First 
it will attempt to show that, for Dostoevsky, even a joyous 
love for life is not capable of sustaining life without a 
corresponding faith in God. Secondly, it will attempt to 
describe the type of world view that is accrued from the life 
affirming experience of the sublime. , Thirdly, it will try 
to show how through personal redemption and self awareness 
man can come to the experience of such a life affirming 
vision. Finally, it will state Dostoevsky’s idea that in 
order for salvation to be more than just a solitary process, 
man must also redeem himself for the sins of others.
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Life Affirmation and the Necessity of God
It is a generally accepted fact that the basis for
Dostoevsky's own sublime, or mystical, experience was his 
disease of epilepsy. His descriptions of the disease it­
self correspond to his ideas about the mystical experience. 
Two of his major characters who have mystical experiences,
Prince Myshkin of The Idiot and Kirilov of The Possessed,
are associated with epilepsy, though the latter is only 
warned by Shatov that he may have the disease. Kirilov 
describes what the experience is like.
There are seconds--they come five or
six at a time--when you suddenly feel
the presence of the eternal harmony 
in all its perfection...It is as 
though you were suddenly in contact 
with all of nature, and you say,
'yes, this is the truth.'
2
This mystical experience of harmony and unity was 
obviously very important to Dostoevsky, and although Kirilov 
was a tragic figure because of his simultaneous atheistic 
idea, we nevertheless learn much about Dostoevsky from the 
Kirilov characterization. Kirilov is an atheistic precursor 
to the finalization of the mystical idea in the character 
of Zossima.
Of course, following from the previous chapter, it was 
Kirilov's atheism which led to his eventual downfall from 
the ranks of Dostoevskian heroes. Despite his apparent un­
bounded love for life, Kirilov nevertheless killed himself.
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It is evident that Dostoevsky believed that even the feeling 
of joy for life cannot by itself sustain life. As we know, 
for Dostoevsky only God is capable of giving final meaning 
to the universe. In other words, it is the mystical life 
affirmation combined with a living faith in God that is 
necessary to sustain a joyous existence. For in Kirilov, 
following from Dostoevsky's psychological interpretation of 
the nature of the "aware" atheist, there was an equal suf­
fering which matched his joy for life. He referred to this 
suffering as the "pain of the fear of death." God, from 
Kirilov's point of view, was only a psychological illusion 
whom man created to counter the "pain of the fear of death."
It was this pain that Kirilov hoped to destroy for all man­
kind through his suicide. He conceived of himself unself­
ishly as a martyr and hoped that through his renunciation 
of the illusion of God he would be able to show that man 
need not fear death anymore. After his own suicide, he 
believed that man would now be able to consent to live 
because he could see, by Kirilov's example, that there 
was no longer any reason to fear death. It would become 
merely a matter of indifference and man would now be able 
to accept the joyous vision that is life without needing to 
create the illusion of God.
Of course Kirilov, rather than appearing as a martyr, 
instead impresses the reader as being insane'. This becomes 
clear when the reader realizes that few in the world were 
ever going to know about his suicide, let alone understand
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his reasons for committing such an act. While imagining 
himself as a public martyr, in reality he was a private 
tragedy dying with only the petty demon Verkhovensky near­
by. The one atheist in Dostoevsky’s novels who was able 
to love life was not even capable of remaining alive, 
precisely because of his atheistic idea. What is impor­
tant to keep in mind in this chapter, therefore, is that 
in spite of the necessity of achieving a sublime or mysti^ 
cal love for life in the thought of Dostoevsky, such a 
love by itself is not sufficient. For a final life affir­
mation to be attained God is necessary to counter the 
’’pain of the fear of death.1' If He does not exist, then 
we have only the nihilism described in its various forms 
4 in the preceding chapter.
Dostoevsky has also shown the importance of God for 
life affirmation in other places. Besides Kirilov, Dosto­
evsky has presented six different variations of the mysti­
cal or sublime awareness. Gibson calls them ’’variations 
on the earthly paradise." Each one of them, though slightly
different from each other, emphasizes that happiness and 
goodness belong to the world and people are capable of . 
living in order to cherish each other. But five of the 
visions remain only ideas, i.e., they are not living 
realities. Only Zossima (and Dolgoruky of the Raw Youth, 
whose vision is "deficient" in another w a y ) , who exper­
ienced a sublime life affirmation in conjunction with a 
faith in God and the immortality of the human soul, was
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able to be a living embodiment of such a vision. All the 
other variations, though similar in content to the finaliza­
tion of this theme in Zossima, are incomplete. For Stavro- 
gin, the vision takes place in a dream and becomes unattain­
able in reality because of his guilt over the death of the
girl Matryosha. For Dolgoruky of the Raw Youth, it remains
only a personal experience without reference to the univer-
salism of the Zossima ideal. For Versilov, also of the Raw 
Youth, it is at best only "an intellectual diversion and a 
wishful forecast of the best that can happen in a godless 
w o r l d . I n  Ivan's poem, the "Geological Cataclysm"
(which he is reminded of through his conversations with the 
devil), the vision is only the product of a self appointed 
man-God, and because of his own atheistic assumptions this 
vision shamed himself in his own eyes. In the Dream of the 
Ridiculous Man the vision is also just a dream, although it 
was one which if it did not lead to a living embodiment, at 
least led to action based on the dream. Of these five
visions, none but DolgorukyTs had God as a central figure,
■)
and only two of them, Ivan's and the ridiculous man's, had 
the universal aspirations of Zossima. What we find in the 
characterizations of Zossima is the linkage of the three 
requirements that make the experience of the sublime a com­
plete experience, a joy and love for life, faith in God, and 
(as shall be emphasized more fully in the next chapter) the 
realization that such an experience is for all men to share 
together.
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To deny God is to deny the actual source of love and 
life. To deny the actual transcendent source is to destroy 
systematically the reality of the vision. The experience 
either becomes situated in emptiness, as symbolized by 
Kirilov, or it becomes only an idea, as it does in all but 
the case of Dolgoruky. God and eternity, on the other hand,
o
are not ideas, but are living realities. Only Zossima, 
of the persons discussed here, appears to have a full under­
standing of this fact.
Sublime World View 
Before'we continue, it is important to emphasize again why 
the experience of the sublime aspect of reality is so impor­
tant for the political thought of Dostoevsky. Before society 
can change, its individual members must change. This is not 
an idle statement when discussing Dostoevsky's thought, but 
rather a central one. For Dostoevsky, the individual atti­
tude, or mode of being, is paramount and all subsequent 
actions, including political ones, are merely reflections 
of this attitude. The discussion of mode of being becomes 
doubly important for Dostoevsky's political ideas when we 
realize his ideal state cannot be reached until all people 
individually and freely choose to come together in one 
Christian brotherhood. In other words, one's mode of being 
is not just one aspect of his political thought but in fact 
is the central aspect. If politics is ever to become 
idealized according to the Dostoevskian "system", man's
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consciousness must change and it is to that new conscious­
ness that Dostoevsky devotes most of his attention.^
So far this chapter has discussed the importance of 
the sublime mode of awareness which results in joyous life 
affirmation and the importance of faith in God in conjunc­
tion with that awareness. The focus will now be on the 
specific world view which such an experience leads to.
For Dostoevsky, the world is endowed with an ultimate 
holiness. It derives its holiness from the fact that God, 
through the person of Jesus Christ, entered the world.^
The holiness of the world is, •therefore, not .an ideal, as
in the dreams of Stavrogin, Versilov, Ivan, etc., but is an
12actuality. Life itself is a mystery, a truth of "para­
mount importance" and for Dostoevsky this mystery was con­
ceived by God in love. All beings are endowed with the 
same holiness that the world as a totality is endowed with. 
The individual Christian, in community with his fellow 
Christians, is believed to form the sacred heart of this
entire creation, all of which undergoes the same regener-
13ative process of redemption. All animals of the earth, 
all plants, and the physical universe itself are "already" 
in mystical harmony with, the All, singing praises to God.
It was a bright, warm still July night, 
a cool mist rose from the broad river.
We could hear the splash of a fish, the 
birds were still, all was hushed and 
beautiful, everything praying to God.
Dostoevsky had a vision of life in which all was para­
dise already. All man had to do was Christianize his being 
in order to realize this fact. All aspects of life, even 
the torments of natural disasters, even the fact of natural 
death itself, are part of the beauty that was conceived by 
God. Everything is in harmony and every animal knows its
place "instinctively." The reality of the world is seen to
15exist beyond its mere materiality. The transcendent pre­
sence becomes an ordering process.^
...we talked of the beauty of this world 
of God's and of the great mystery of.it.
Every blade of grass, every insect, ant 
and golden bee, all so marvelously know 
their path. Though they have not the 
intelligence, they bear witness to the 
mystery of God and continually accomplish 
it themselves.
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It is the very beauty of the world which convinces
Zossima, and Dostoevsky, of its ultimate justice, for it
is this holy beauty which gives the world its intrinsic 
18worth. Its lack of concern with the reality of beauty
was one of Do.stoevsky' s major criticisms of much of the
political activity of his time. One of the themes of the
Legend of the Grand Inquisitor is the bankruptcy of life
that ensues when men seek after "bread" at the expense of
beauty. Before a material solution can be found, man
must learn to cultivate the awareness of beauty within him-
19self,and others. It is the beauty, wonder and holiness 
of life itself that man must learn to tune his body and 
consciousness into with a heightened awareness. All that
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exists outside of the free man, with his knowledge of good
and evil, is automatically perfect and sinless. Man alone
20must learn to become harmonious with life. Man must throw 
away his dogmatism and learn the living faith of life and
o 1
come to a realization of an ecstatic world sensation/1
Upon such an experience of the sublime in existence, 
one is immediately enamored with a thorough love for life.
In speaking of animals as an aspect of holy creation, Dos­
toevsky went so far as to say that even they will respond 
to a love freely given; and actually tells the story, 
through the words of Zossima, of a great monk who pitied 
the hunger of a grizzly bear. He went to feed the bear 
and said, IfGo along, Christ be with you." The bear walked 
"away meekly and obediently, doing no harm."
The point of the tale, beyond the intended literalness 
of the story, is twofold. First of all, as we shall empha­
size in Chapter Three, active love is perceived to be a 
force which can reach beyond itself and effect change in 
others. In other words, Christian love is considered to 
be an active social force. Secondly, the story tells us 
that one's expression of active love in union with the eter­
nal must take preference over the individualized self. One 
can show no fear in the face of the eternal, for fear is a 
sign of lack of faith. One does not have faith that his 
individual earthly life will be protected (for one must learn 
to welcome and even cherish natural death), but rather one 
must learn to have faith in being part of the eternal cosmic
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unity called life. One cannot compromise the eternal for 
that which is not, for=to do so constitutes pride.
How to Attain to the Sublime World View 
How is man to attain to an experience of the holy, 
sublime, harmonious and beautiful? Unfortunately, Dos-
22toevsky appears to be relatively vague about this question. 
While constantly extolling man to come to a vision of the 
holy and beautiful in creation, he never explicates either 
a precise or particular means for an individual to come to 
a realization. Though he does attempt to offer a Christian 
solution to the problem through the notion of redemption, 
often times in his works the hero who attains to his life 
affirming vision seems to do so, not by his own effort, but
2 3by a miracle, i.e., something outside his own will and effort. 
They often are overcome by an experience rather than achieving 
the vision as the culmination of conscious and dedicated ef­
fort. The most obvious examples of this are Myshkin, Kirilov, 
Zossima, and Alyosha. It is as if the final realization of 
the ecstatic world sensation can be realized only through 
the grace of G o d . ^  But even if this were totally the case, 
it is nevertheless evident that man must attempt to seek 
the truth anyway, for the experience of the holy and har-
2 Smonious in -the presence of God is the ultimate human value.
Dostoevsky does, however, give his readers some ideas 
about how to seek enlightenment. In order to find salvation, 
one must first realize that it cannot be sought or con­
ceived of in an intellectual manner. One must learn that
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faith is prior to reason and that reason must learn to trust 
the faith of the heart and to accept its judgments.^ In 
this sense Dostoevsky was radically anti-reason. Man simply 
has not the intellectual ability to understand why things 
ultimately are as they are. He must learn to leave his 
Euclidean mind behind and realize that without faith there 
can be no peaks of human experience.^  Man must learn to 
see himself in a different manner. He has to realize that 
he is the representative of God in existence and that he
28is His instrument in the unfolding drama of human history.
Man is also that being within whom God makes himself 
known. But this is only a possibility, and not a neces­
sity, for man is endowed with freedom with which he can 
use either to accept or reject the truth. It is the re­
jection of God and the life affirming vision that consti­
tutes man’s prideful and sinful nature. His sin is his 
inability to seek the sublime and harmonious in life and 
his inability and lack of desire to attain to Christian 
love. ”Sin is smog, and the smog will disappear when the 
sun rises in its power...” Because of man's inherent qua­
lity of freedom, he is not capable of acting in a purely 
instinctive manner, as do the animals, for to do so would 
make him cease to be a man in its denial of conscious 
freedom. Man is the only creature blessed with the freedom 
to sin, and because of this he must learn how to accept 
what his own blind and egoistic self may deny,. Through his 
rejection of the primacy of the living life of joy, in favor 
of the life of the body without the spirit, man has become
sinful.
Man must learn to come to an awareness of this rejec­
tion within himself, for the ability to say yes to all of 
life entails a knowledge of what sin is and what it is not.
Sin is any act (including thought) which serves to perpetu­
ate the repression of the eternal harmony. It is not a 
matter of the simple breaking of certain laws which seem to 
be hanging abstractly in space disconnected from all that 
is living. While this may be sin and while it might even be 
necessary for these laws to be there as symbolic of the 
meaning of existence, they do not constitute an absolute of 
themselves and for all time. The laws of the metaphysician 
are not structured in the same sense as the laws of the logician. To
Dostoevsky, in order for any moral law to be considered
29truthful, it must ultimately be grounded in actuality.
The power of morality is based not on man-made law, but
30stands in the very nature of man himself. The whole no­
tion of redemption is based on this assumption. Characters, 
such as Raskolnikov, bear witness to Dostoevsky1s notion that 
sin and guilt are expiated by an existential faith in con­
science . A sin can rarely be absolutized into specific acts, 
but rather is absolute in the sense that any act which does 
not spring from a sincere concern with the Good is considered 
to be sinful.
Dostoevsky believed that the expiation of sin and guilt 
was one of the most difficult acts anyone could perform.
It takes an intense knowledge of the self and also takes
the conscious giving up of false pride in the face of one's 
contrition. One must be able to feel openly without shame 
and be able to overcome the restrictions of the human will 
which, like Stavrogin, can only negate. Atonement involves 
no less than an actual awakening of the heart from a slum­
ber that in many cases is close to death. Between this 
side of life, with.its waking sleep aspects of security, 
and the other side of life, in which the idea of the joyous 
union with life transcends the idea and becomes living fact, 
exists the psychological barrier of man's need to free him­
self from his guilt.
In his novels Dostoevsky often shows the man who has 
committed the great sin purging his guilt and attaining, if 
not the experience of unity, at least an awareness of what 
such a unity entails. The major example of this is Raskol­
nikov in the novel Crime and Punishment. It has sometimes 
been suggested by critics that Dostoevsky even means to 
say that the great crime must be committed by men in order 
to find the way to salvation. Actually this is not true- 
all men have committed at least sins of denial by ignoring 
the needs of others--for each man has a knowledge of his 
own sins within himself and most of them would certainly 
not be considered the great crime. Nevertheless, certain 
sins are worse than others and they become progressively 
worse in the intensity of their denial of life. Often, 
fantastic crimes such as murder are the only ones which 
will finally awaken a person from his slumber and alert him
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to the intensity of the wrong he has committed. It does 
take the "great" crime for some to realize the need for 
redemption. Dostoevsky's technique of the "great" crime 
is also used to bring the reader to the same experiential 
situation in which his "great" criminals are placed, and 
makes it easier for the reader to grasp his own need for 
redemption.
Dostoevsky also shows that the "great" crime is not 
a prerequisite for salvation, and the example of Zossima 
is a case in point. Zossima realized the means to salva­
tion simply after slapping a servant. What is important 
to realize is that to be unable to love and to perceive 
the holy and sublime in life means you already are in the 
state of sin, and this fact will be reflected in all that 
you do.
It is necessary for Dostoevsky to show what the ex­
piation of sin can involve. Zossima tells the story of 
an extremely successful businessman who also had an aware­
ness of the truth of the living God. As a youth this man 
had committed a murder in a fit of “jealousy, but the only 
remorse he had felt was that the object of his devotion 
was no longer there. His, life had been successful since 
the murder; he was well known throughout the community 
for his philanthropic work and had two children by a 
recently married wife. Suddenly, after many years of 
being able to ignore the guilt of his act, he began to 
feel intense feelings of regret, and his life was becoming
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one long series of depressions. He no longer felt he had 
the right to love his wife and children because he was har­
boring the secret of his murder. He knew what was happening 
and he knew he would somehow have to atone for his sin in 
order to be able to shed his guilt. If he could not, he 
would have to resolve himself to living the rest of his 
life repressing the guilt and ignoring the fact that he 
would never be able to live the life of active love. The 
advice that Zossima gives is that he must confess the sin 
by realizing and facing the facts of its dimensions without 
flinching. What this entailed for the businessman was sim­
ply to have the strength to look honestly at himself; in a 
sense the rest would come automatically. The criminal 
needs to make a public confession in order to become one 
with his community of fellow men. As with Raskolnikov, it 
does not matter what the authorities are concerned with, 
because it is a moral obligation to present oneself as one 
is. One's everyday self must die to itself; it must anni­
hilate itself and give itself up altogether, undividedly
31and unconditionally, to everything and everyone. To be 
able to look inside oneself and clearly face what has 
caused one guilt, and subsequently to be able to ask for­
giveness and to forgive oneself, is the message that Dos­
toevsky wishes to impart.
Verily, verily, I say unto you, except 
a corn of wheat fall into the ground 
and die, it abideth alone; but if it 
dies it bringeth forth great fruit.
32
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One must experience, accept, and endure the pain of 
remorse for confession to matter. To be true to life one 
must make the fact known; to do otherwise is to deny what 
you are to those around you. To live life in full one must 
not harbor any secrets. But to take this last step into 
accepting what you have in the past repressed, one must 
have faith. One must believe that what one is doing is 
endowed with ultimate meaning. Dostoevsky says that only 
a faith in the living God can enable man to do this. For 
without God everything is permitted, including a rejection
t
of the Good. The point about faith for Dostoevsky is that
33it is existential and not doctrinal. This means that 
one does not concentrate all his energies on a belief that 
to him is abstract, and in reality divorced from the self. 
Rather, it is an experiential faith that literally requires 
a leap into life itself. It is at the core of one's heart 
that this decision of being must be made. For Dostoevsky 
the goal of this faith is union with God and it is the 
goal of all Christian life. It is a process which is be­
gun in the here and now, and is "one made possible by 
man's participation in the divine energies which manifest 
in creation what is knowable of the essentially unknowable
Q  /
Triune God." It is at the psychological point where one 
is capable of expiating one's sin that a decision between 
faith in life versus rejection back into comfort must be 
made. The rejection makes all that was once seen as 
potentially real to appear to be merely figments of the
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imagination. The decision of faith is so difficult be­
cause it is so total, and because it demands total respon­
sibility on the part of the individual.
The point of the story of the businessman is that his 
confession would have made the worldly life of his family 
miserable, due to the public knowledge of the event. But 
still the primacy of the truth must be served. The logic 
of this is sound because worldly comfort without knowledge 
of the eternal is ultimately worthless. To Dostoevsky, the 
living example this man had shown his family was infinitely 
more valuable than any worldly recognition of which his 
family may have been deprived. What matters is that he 
has set an example of strength and joy that must be followed, 
for the truth is never dependent on worldly riches or worldly 
justice. That which is beautiful and holy can never be 
sacrificed for that which is simply utilitarian. Worldly 
necessities are only aspects of the greater whole. Without 
an understanding of.the truth they are in fact worthless.
The businessman almost did not have the strength; he 
almost killed Zossima in complete denial of the holy. But 
because he was sincerely trying, "grace" saved him. "Seek 
and ye shall find" is what the mystical Christian learns to 
understand according to Dostoevsky.
Once the Christian finds himself to be the "man within 
the man" he is considered part of the waking holy. He is 
in tune with the eternal. Without the eternal, life is only 
of the mind and of the body; what is missing is the soul.
Dostoevsky believed the modern educated man killed his 
capacity for active love because of his denial of the soul. 
The redeemed man, endowed with mind, body and heart, is 
cleansed of his unseen guilts and is now capable of living 
his life anew.
The Need to be Responsible "For All and Everything'1 
In order for redemption to be more than just a soli­
tary process, man must also learn to redeem himself for the 
sins of others. One's expiation of one's personal sins, is 
not the final and last step for an individual. Each man 
is responsible in the ultimate sense toward his brother.
For Dostoevsky, according to Zossima's radical formula of 
Christian agape, life is one continual redemptive process. 
Man must continually realize that he is responsible for 
other people being blinded to the sublime and holy. As 
we shall explore more fully in the next chapter, it is 
this radical Christian stance that becomes a necessary link 
in the Dostoevskian ideal and which finally expresses it­
self through, a Christian solidarity. It is this acceptance 
of universal guilt which is essential for Dostoevsky's moral
order; without it his notion of salvation remains only a
*
solitary affair.
Do not say "sin is mighty, wickedness 
is mighty, evil environment is mighty, 
and we are lonely and helpless, and evil 
environment is wearing us away and hin­
dering our good work from being done."
Fly from that dejection children! There 
is only one means of salvation, then take 
yourself and make yourself responsible
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for all men's sins, that is your truth, 
you know friends, as soon as you make 
yourself responsible for.everything and 
•for all men, you shall see at once that 
it really is so, and that you are to blame 
for everyone and for all things. But 
throwing your indolence and impotence on 
others you will end by sharing the pride 
of Satan and murmuring against God.
35
It is up to the man who has gained knowledge of him­
self and who has acquired faith in life to try literally to 
save the world. For Dostoevsky, the truth of such a philo­
sophy is that it does not preach an abstract truth of jus­
tice or morality. Rather, it calls for man to look inside 
himself and not flinch at what he sees. The man of know­
ledge loves all of life and this necessitates his trying 
to bring the same love out of others.
Work without ceasing. If you remember 
in the night as you go to sleep, "I have 
not done what I ought to have done," rise 
up and do it. If the people around you 
are spiteful and callous and will not 
hear you, fall down before them and beg 
their forgiveness; for in truth you are 
to blame for their not wanting to hear 
you. And if you cannot speak to them in 
their bitterness, serve them in silence 
and humility, never losing hope. If all 
men abandon you and even drive you away 
by force, then when you are left alone 
fall on the earth and kiss it, water it 
with your tears and it will bring forth 
fruit even though no one has heard you 
in your solitude. Believe to the end, 
even if all men went astray and you were 
the only one faithful, bring your offering 
even then and praise God in your loneli­
ness. And if two of you are together, 
there is a whole world, a world of living 
love. Embrace each other tenderly and 
praise God, for if only in you two, His 
truth has been fulfilled.
36
The political connotations of such an expression by 
Dostoevsky are dynamically and totally revolutionary. It 
is revolutionary because it is calling man to make a total 
commitment to self perfection. It is asking man to give 
up his comfort, to give up all aspects of himself that 
take part in the rejection and blanketing of life. It 
is a philosophy that is asking man to trade in what he 
owns in exchange for what he can be. It is a philosophy 
which states that the first real political act of man is 
an act of self repentance and redemption. To Dostoevsky, 
this ideal, which he believed mankind to be ultimately 
striving toward, was really the highest form of realism.
Dostoevsky’s ideal of self perfection includes man’s 
responsibility for establishing a genuine community of 
men. Self perfection is never reached in isolation but 
only by establishing a harmonious relationship with others. 
Self perfection includes radical humility and universal 
responsibility; without these notions man would not go 
beyond himself to seek salvation for others. The securing 
of the proper Christian attitude, i.e., acceptance of the 
fact that we really are to"blame for all and everything," 
is the very means by which man will be able to come to­
gether in Christian communion. A true Christian will 
blame himself for the fact that all men are not brothers 
sharing in God’s vision and it is this situation he will 
spend his lifetime trying to rectify. It is to the ex­
plication of the idea that "each are responsible for all
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CHAPTER III
RADICAL HUMILITY AND CHRISTIAN BROTHERHOOD
(The final Christian goal) is a fellow­
ship with respect for national indivi­
dualities, for their preservation, for 
the maintenance of complete liberty of 
men, with the indication of what liber­
ty comprises, i.e., loving communion, 
guaranteed by deeds, by the living ex­
ample, by the factual deed of brother­
hood, and not under the threat of the 
guillotine, not by the means of chopping 
off millions of heads. % J
1
The Personal Acceptance of Guilt for All Man1 s 
Sins as a Means to the Ideal Christian Order 
The previous chapter has tried to show the type of 
vision and faith experience that Dostoevsky believed to be 
essential to leading a full, holy, and truthful life. But 
the most important aspect of that vision, at least as far 
as political theory is concerned, is the societal implica­
tions that•the author of that vision intended to portray. 
While Dostoevsky does give his readers a very good general
picture of what he viewed the ideal society to be and how
\
it should be attained, as this chapter will attempt to show, 
he nevertheless failed to iron out some of the final details 
and intricacies of his social ideal. He was not clear or 
consistent with respect to certain obvious problems--the most
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conspicuous one being the problem of how the Christian 
idealist should deal with violence, both political and 
otherwise, in his midst. While his Brothers Karamazov 
does seem to lean toward a Christian pacifist ideal, it 
is difficult to ignore various opinions expressed by him 
in the Diary of a Writer, which seem to run counter to 
the stand presented in the novel. In other words, much 
of his proposed free Christian brotherhood seems contra­
dicted in the Diary by what appears to be only a narrow 
kind of political chauvinism. Although ideally politics
t
is only a function of the religious attitude throughout 
all his works, including the Diary, often his actual poli­
tical stance appears not to be derived from his religious 
ideal.
The preceding chapter focused primarily on Dostoevsky*s
ideas concerning the individual experience of the holy in
creation. But the religious/political ideal was never seen
to be something that was intended only for individuals
standing alone amidst a mass of other individuals. Rather,
the final religious/political expression was to be a
2
shared experience of worship within a community. The 
religious community of man freely coming together in a 
common faith and wox*ship experience may not ordinarily be 
understood to have a direct and final connection with a 
political ideal. But it is precisely this connection that 
Dostoevsky wishes to convey as essential to any political 
community. In the modern West the concept of the religious
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community is usually conceived of as something that should 
exist separately from the political order. Since the time 
of the Reformation this has been viewed as a protection of 
the individual's (or individual community's) rights. This 
was primarily a reaction to the relatively totalitarian 
mode of organization practiced by the Catholic Church in 
the Middle Ages.. The point here is that it is a relatively 
alien notion in the post-reformation West to have a religious 
community as the ideal for the final political expression of 
the social order. When asked to name an intellectual figure 
in the West who corresponds roughly in thought to Dostoevsky's 
Christian ideal, one is hard pressed to find a name.
But Dostoevsky's stance is not hard to understand once 
we understand what it means to refer to him as an absolutist 
thinker. He could not accept a certain mode of being in 
one type of human endeavor and then another mode of being 
in another type of human activity. All human activity 
should be pervaded by one spirit, in his case the Christian 
stance of radical humility and active love in light of the 
holy in creation. For Dostoevsky, the state was not a 
separate entity of its own that could operate under dif­
ferent principles because of its unique position relative 
to men. Rather the state was made up only of men and its 
activities could not be considered essentially different 
from any other human activity. He had only contempt for 
the notion of "realist" politics and bitterly criticized
the West on this issue, with the brunt of the criticism
3
being heaped upon the Catholic Church. In order for
politics to escape the '.'realist" trap, the individual men
who made political decisions in the name of the state would
have to begin acting in an idealistic manner. In other
words, the ultimate political solution must start with the
individual mode of being. There is no "external" political
.solution to the troubles of the world, only an "internal"
4one.
Therefore, when speaking of the final political ideal, 
we must begin by speaking of the proper mode of being that 
ideally all people must engage. We have already spoken of 
the, "objective" mystical or sublime vision and the means 
to*, attain to such an awareness in the previous chapter.
We can now concentrate more fully on the relationships that 
man must begin to form with his fellow man, i.e., the 
"subjective" ideal which is illuminated by the joyous 
acceptance of the "objective" beauty and holiness of the 
world, and which is reflected in the idea that "each are 
responsible for all and everything."
Dostoevsky's ideal of the final goal for mankind was 
the creation of a universal free Christian brotherhood. Of 
course such an ideal was not going to come about merely by 
proclaiming it as an ideal, rather men were going to have 
to actively pursue it. It must begin with men who under­
stand what it really means to be a Christian and who are
willing to seek for the purging of egoistic pride from the 
human heart. Dostoevsky believed that the biggest obsta­
cle to a brotherhood of man was pride, or the reverse side 
of pride, humiliation. Man develops false pride as a de­
fense against being humiliated, and thus, traps himself in 
a vicious circle of hurt and be hurt. The active Christian 
idealist must first devote his attention to the breaking 
of this barrier between men.
This theme is recurrent in Dostoevsky's -writings and 
it is in the characters of Zossima and Alyosha that he is 
most successful in creating the type of individual who is 
capable of transcending the "vicious circle." The primary 
and essential characteristics of Zossima and Alyosha are a 
. radical Christian humility and an active love. They are 
living embodiments of Zossima1s exhortation that "each are
9
responsible for all and everything" and both willingly took 
to heart the belief that ail men share guilt with all other 
men for all sin. In the modern world of science and "realis 
tic" politics, it is hard to imagine perceiving such a mode 
of being as an influential social force. But Dostoevsky 
believed it to be the ultimate social force and the only 
chance man had to attain to a brotherhood./* He followed 
the dictum that humiliation damns while humility sanctifies, 
and from that assumption we can better understand Zossimafs 
belief in the idea of universal guilt.^
Once one internalizes the humble assumption that in 
fact we all are equally guilty for all sins, then the subtle
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humiliating force of moralism can never enter any situation. 
Moralism, as embodied in,the character of Father Ferapont, is 
that attitude which, however subtly it may be hidden from the
g
self, assumes a moral superiority over the next individual.
This is why Myshkin fails as a character where Alyosha succeeds, 
i.e., lurking behind his apparent benevolence was an aristo­
cratic assumption of.moral superiority.
In this context, another idea that men had to avoid be­
sides moralism was determinism. While moralism implies that 
sin is the moral responsibility solely of the perpetrator, de­
terminism claims that in reality there is no sin. Dostoevsky 
was a vehement opposer of such ideas and devoted a large portion 
of his Letters from the Underworld in satirical refutation of 
the followers of Cernyshevsky. Determinism, like moralism, 
was also seen to be an obstacle preventing the future establish­
ment of a free brotherhood of man. If one operates under the 
assumption that ideal social behavior can be brought about 
through certain environmental factors, then one immediately 
precludes that essential fact about man which a free brotherhood 
assumes, i.e., his freedom. Dostoevsky had very little sympathy 
for deterministic philosophies of any kind precisely for, this 
reason.
In his critique of the Russian criminal system, both in 
t l^e Diary and his novels, Dostoevsky brings up the problem of 
moralism and determinism. In his opinion, the Russian criminal 
system seemed to vacilate between the two positions without
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being able to transcend them.or "focus on the proper attitude.
His critique of xiioralism as a proper mode to judge a criminal 
(or sinner) is clearly expressed in the trials of Raskolnikov 
and Dmitri, especially the latter. The emphasis from the prose­
cution's standpoint was, in both cases,.on the sole guilt of the 
suspect. In modern Western individualistic society (if not all 
societies), it is usually assumed (except by the determinists) 
that when an individual commits a crime, the responsibility and 
guilt for that crime is his alone. But it is precisely this 
type of attitude which Dostoevsky saw as mistaken. In his 
"each are responsible for all and everything" formula, there is 
the assumption that there is much more to a criminal act than 
merely the finalization of that act. Crime and sin are often 
in^the heart but only sometimes do they get expressed in action. 
Putting it in rationalistic form, his .argument states that al­
though the criminal is guilty, he is not solely guilty. If 
each one of us in our hearts truly lived a life of active love 
and Christian humility, then maybe the individual who committed 
the crime might not have found cause to do so in the first 
place. In other words, Dostoevsky meant to say that it is the 
prideful attitude which is the basis for the "segregation" be­
tween men. To take the attitude that one is morally superior 
to another because another has sinned serves only to perpetuate 
that "segregation." It is necessary to keep in mind that Dos­
toevsky's social ideal was a Christian brotherhood, and his 
number one priority was the eradicating of all obstacles which 
prevented such an ideal from occurring. In the personal
acceptance of guilt and responsibility for all sin, he 
believed that man would solve the segregating problem of 
moralism, as well as tear down all other barriers. Once a 
man learns to share equally all guilt, he will be able to 
move closer to others in a true spirit of agape. Once one 
assumes his own moral superiority in relation to another 
individual, the possibility of ever becoming as a brother 
to that individual is dismissed. Judging others morally 
inferior to oneself leads only to the perpetuation of 
the vicious circle of hurt and be hurt, and a brother­
hood of man becomes an impossibility. The assumption is, 
of course, that each are finally saved only when all men 
fare saved.
The other trap the criminal system fell prey to in
:.Russia was its reliance on deterministic interpretations
of crime. We see this clearly in the defense attorney's
case for Dmitri's "innocence" and in articles from Dos-
9
toevsky's Diary . Dostoevsky often complained about the 
attitudes of juries and defense lawyers in criminal cases. 
Either they would explain away crime by way of environmen­
tal causal explanations or they would claim that given, the 
circumstances certain acts were understandable, even justi 
fiable. But this type of reaction to the equally disas- 
terous attitude of moralism was not what Dostoevsky had in 
mind either.
The point is that a sin is still a sin (or a crime is 
still a crime) and to say that no one is guilty is as fals
as heaping all the guilt onto a single individual. In re­
ality all men are guilty for mankind's present state. Man, 
both individually and as a unit, is guilty of the fact that 
God's paradise has been ignored. He shares guilt with his 
ancestors and his progeny for the failure to establish the 
final faith community in love. In order for man to begin 
rectifying this situation he must come to a realization of 
his own guilt. His act of redemption will be the tearing 
down of walls between men in a feeling of assumed brother­
hood. Only through the true acceptance of shared guilt by 
all men, for all sin, in all its manifestations, can mankind 
move closer together and ultimately transcend sin altogether. 
It is this attitude only which is capable of tearing down 
barriers between all men, and without which a final Chris­
tian brotherhood becomes an impossibility.
Dostoevsky was intuitively aware of how difficult it 
would be to destroy this barrier between men. Men are al­
ways on the defensive against other men, always fearing 
some form of humiliation. In order to protect himself, he 
builds up internal defenses which become almost second na­
ture to him. Realizing this, an active Christian must never 
give up nor ever become discouraged. An example of just 
what kind of attitude is necessary for the active Christian 
can be shown through the character of Alyosha. Alyosha's
main activity is to give impulse toward the final Christian
10realization of a brotherhood of man. He changes the world 
through a Christian mode of being, not through overt political
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actions. The Christian revolution will not be one directed 
at external structures, but will be an invisible one which 
will transcend civilization's forms.^ From the outside it 
may appear that no significant change is being made, but re­
lationships between all people will become radically changed 
for the better precisely because of people like Alyosha. 
Dostoevsky's hope was that such a change was occurring in 
Russia and would eventually spread throughout the whole 
world.
Dostoevsky called Alyosha a person "who carries within
himself the heart of the universal, while the rest of the
men of his epoch have for some reason been temporarily torn
12from it, as if by a gust of wind..'.1 Alyosha is remarkable 
because he is a young man who is almost completely devoid 
of false pride or moralism. He seems almost incapable of 
not being open with all people, and this openness reflects 
both a firmness and gentleness of heart. He never morally 
condemns others, nor has he need for the defense mechanism 
which insists on the humiliation of others in order to re­
store one1s own injured ego. His selflessness is so dis­
arming to those around him that they are sometimes wary, 
fearing that maybe beneath it all he feels a moral superi­
ority and that the guise of. humility really protects a gar­
gantuan ego. But Alyosha is no Stavrogin fantasizing about 
his great moral idea, but rather is a sincere and open 
individual.
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An example of the disarmingness of.Alyosha’s person­
ality and of the difficulties that Dostoevsky perceived in 
the breaking of the "vicious circle" can be shown in the 
chapter entitled "And in the Open Air," in which Alyosha is 
trying to persuade Illusba’s father to take some money on 
behalf of Katrina Ivanovna. The Captain does not wish to 
take the money because he feels it is really an Insult and 
only an attempt to buy off his honor. Alyosha's response 
is given purely, and he tries to show that man must learn 
to trust other men as their equals and to transcend any 
fear of humiliation.
She told me to persuade you to take these 
two hundred roubles from her, as from a 
sister, knowing that you are in such need.
No one will know of it, it can give no rise 
to unjust slander. There are two hundred 
roubles, and I swe^r you must take them 
unless--unless all men are to be enemies 
on earth. But there are brothers on earth 
...You have a generous heart...you must see 
that, you must.
13
It is this kind of spirit, as typified by Alyosha, that man 
must learn to internalize in all endeavors for any final 
political solution to come about. It cannot be repeated 
too often that for Dostoevsky, the solving of man’s political 
probems begins in the developing of the proper attitude among 
men. There can be no separation of certain types of endea­
vors from this proper Christian attitude. Agape was seen 
by Dostoevsky to be a social force and men like Alyosha 
would hopefully spread the word by their example.
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The assumption, of course, is that active love breeds 
active love and self-redemption, and that the perception of 
the sublime awareness can also be spread by such actions.
Ideally, once all men were to attain to the proper 
Christian spirit, the final community of men would trans­
cend sin and guilt and be an existential union of worship
in which God and -mankind are joined together in one mysti- 
14cal union. The walls that exist between men, and between
man and God would be broken down. Man would come together
15in a free solidarity which no longer would be hindered 
by moral law, such as that practiced by Zossima's nemesis 
Ferapont. In fact, Dostoevsky viewed all law with suspi­
cion, not in the sense of the symbolic meaning it may have
16meant to portray, but in the sense of its coercive force.
What will remain will be a free community of men, integrated 
by Christian agape, with a living comprehension of the holy 
paradise that is earth, and an existential faith in the 
divine principle of the Universe.
As is evident by now, Dostoevsky’s conception of the 
final politica.l/religious solution had little to do with 
greater material comforts, or even material necessity. But 
he ignores all notions of material welfare only in so far 
as he considers them secondary to the Christian experience. 
Obviously he was aware that man needs food and shelter to 
stay alive, but these necessities of themselves cannot be 
considered worthy political goals. First man must concen­
trate on his spiritual nature, or that essence which is
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particularly human. To be concerned solely with that which 
is transitory is to be venial at best and it is to ignore 
that aspect of man which differentiates him from the ani­
mal .
Dostoevsky not only believed that man should seek the 
Christian ideal, but he also believed, as any true Chris­
tian does, that "the Church in the end must undoubtedly be­
come the kingdom ruling over all the earth; of that we have
17the divine promise." The Church, of course, represents 
the final community of worship. In other words, Dostoevsky 
had some prophetic ideas. It is this optimistic theme 
which pervades the whole of the Brothers Karamazov, and 
the book appropriately ends on such a note with "the boys" 
and Alyosha discussing eternity. The. Christian ideal will 
be shared by all and for all time.
’Karamazov!1 cried Kalya, ’can it be true 
that what’s taught us in religion, that we
shall rise from the dead and shall live and
see each other again, all, Illusha too?’
'Certainly we shall rise again, certainly 
we shall see each other and shall tell each 
other with joy and gladness all that has 
happened.’
18
Coercive Power of the Ideal Christian Order 
We have mentioned so far that the Christian ideal will
be a Christian solidarity and that in order to attain to
this final order, man must first break the "vicious circle" 
of hurt by accepting a radical humility which claims no
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one morally superior to anyone else. This humility is 
epitomized by Zossima's remark that "each are responsible 
for all and everything." But the question still remains 
as tO' what the coercive authority of society would be when 
the final Christian solidarity (i.e., the Church) rules over 
all the earth. It is here that Dostoevsky becomes a little 
ambiguous and the reader is less certain as to the exact 
nature of society's coercive power.
First of all it must be realized that the final Chris- 
tian solidarity will be a universal one. Despite Dostoevsky's 
great reputation as a nationalist, his ideal of a final 
order was one that transcended national boundaries. It is 
not that he believed in the viability of one world state 
or one world culture, but he did believe that the ultimate 
goal of man, to establish a Christian mode of being, would
9
be shared throughout the world. In other words, that which 
is essential in man overrides any differences that may re­
sult from cultural dissimilarities. It is this universal 
brotherhood which he considered to be the final establish­
ment of an ecumenical Church on earth.
For Dostoevsky, all men will be finally saved "through
19the universal communion in the name of Christ." The 
Church would ultimately preclude all national prejudices; 
and the state, if it were to exist at all, would have no 
coercive authority but would only exist for organizational 
purposes. The Church would have all coercive authority
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and in the end the "earthly "state should become nothing
else but a Church, rejecting every purpose incongruous
20with the aims of the Church."
It Is important to realize that from Dostoevsky’s
viewpoint there was a tremendous difference between the
Church and state being one, and the Church standing alone
as the final authority. His final goal was that the "state
should end by being worthy to become only the Church and
21
nothing else." When the state exists as something other 
than the Church, it means that a separate coercive authority 
exists which claims the right to restrict a person’s free­
dom given certain circumstances. Apparently, if the 
Church’s principles ruled the world, there would be little 
or no restriction of human activity,in the physically forci­
ble sense, and what restrictions there would be would have
«
as its end only the Christian redemption of the individual.
"If there were none but the ecclesiastical court, the Church
would not even now sentence a criminal to prison or to
death. Crime and the way of regarding it would inevitably 
22
change..." Of course, the Church would retain authority,
but such authority would be of a religious nature. "If
everything became the Church, the Church would exclude all
the criminal and disobedient, and would not cut off their 
23
heads." There would be another supposedly stronger 
coercive force than the fear of death or prison which would 
act on all sinners and criminals. This force xvould be the 
fear of being excluded from the Church of Christ. In the
old system, in which Church and state are separated, the
criminal falsely feels that lie has only sinned against the
state and not the Church or community. "'I steal,' he says,
but I don't go against the Church. I am not an enemy of 
24
C h r i s t . I n  the new system he will come to see that 
crime is in reality a sin against the Church. When the 
Church takes the place of the state, it will be difficult 
for the criminal, according to the Dostoevskian ideal, to 
put himself in opposition to a Church that is worldwide.
He will not make the mistake of thinking himself right in 
the face of universal opinion which says otherwise. There­
fore, it will be a function of the Church to renounce the 
"pagan attitude" of mechanically cutting off its tainted 
member for the preservation of society and to "completely
,25
and honestly adopt the idea of the regeneration of mankind" 
Dostoevsky viewed the old form of treating criminals as 
not meaningful in any sense. The simple cutting off of a 
member of society does not lead to an existential realiza­
tion of the proper mode of being. The only thing that does 
do this, as we have seen, is the recognition of sin by con­
science. The new world order, as far as it is responsible 
toward its individual members, must be able to instill with­
in its members sensitivity and insight so that each person 
will recognize in himself that which is sinful. Dostoevsky
saw the hypersensitive Christian conscience as the only
2 6
true and effectual deterent of sin. "It is only by 
recognizing his wrong-doing as a son of a Christian society—
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that is, of the Church--that"he recognizes his sin against
2 7
society--that is, against the Church.11
The problem that still remains here is that Dostoevsky 
does not specifically state how the Church would go about 
regenerating its individual members (though one would as­
sume that all men would be the regenerators), nor does he 
discuss what type of action is justified in pursuing this 
end. In taking Zossima's speech in his drawing room as the 
final say on this issue, the reader is still not certain 
whether there will be "Christian anarchy"or if the Church, 
for the benefit of the individual, will forcibly restrain 
the individual transgressor in order that she may have him 
in her grasp. Ivan, in his discussion of ecclesiastical 
courts, appears to lean toward "Christian anarchy" and 
Zossima seems to be in agreement. But at one point Zossima 
says that "if society, as a Church, had jurisdiction, then
it would know whom to bring back from exclusion and to re-
28unite with itself." At first glance it might appear that 
the statement has as its underlying assumption the belief 
that the Church does have a right to exclude physically 
transgressors from society, otherwise she could never bring 
them "back from exclusion." But the reader is uncertain as 
to exactly what Zossima means by the word exclusion. Seeing 
it as a follow up of the way Ivan uses the word, it can be 
easily seen to mean only spiritual, and not physical, exclusion.
In a sense this is a very important point. If society 
is allowed to force criminals to be excluded from itself
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and not reunite them until they have come to the same type 
of religious understanding that the. dominant society has, 
then that comes very close to proclaiming a totalitarian 
society as the ideal one. Dostoevsky never would have 
looked at it this way, because when speaking of the uni­
versal Church, he was operating under the assumption that 
all men already believe in the religious attitude of the 
dominant society. Therefore, the criminal would only have 
to realize that his particular transgression was wrong 
given his own religious assumptions. He would not have to 
change his world view. It was easy for Dostoevsky to make 
this assumption because he wrote in a Russia which he per­
ceived to be nearly unanimously Orthodox. The point is that 
in speaking of the ideal order he. assumed that all already 
were of one mind. But, nevertheless, it seems that "Chris­
tian anarchy” would be more consistent with the notion of 
free brotherhood, precisely because of the fact that man 
must remain spiritually free, even if that freedom is used 
to reject the truth. If a Church, as society, were in 
principle to exclude transgressors until they came around 
to the same view as the dominant force, they would be 
practicing a type of spiritual coercion which Dostoevsky 
vehemently criticized in revolutionary groups and the 
Catholic Church. It, therefore, would appear unlikely that 
physical exclusion is considered acceptable in the ideal 
Christian order according to Dostoevsky, though we cannot 
be sure.
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But this raises another problem: How specifically
does the Church go about regenerating the criminal and what
would society, as Church, do with that murderer who chose
not to be regenerated? This question is not answered in
the Brothers Karamazov or anywhere else, and it is because
of this that one author states that "his eschatology was
symbolic of the hope of universal redemption, not a prac-
29
tical political catechism." Calling his final ideal only 
symbolic of his hope for universal redemption solved the 
problem of the murderer by simply stating that Dostoevsky 
never really believed that such a final order could ever be 
established. This may very well be so, but it is hard to 
accept this given the fact that the whole of the Diary speci­
fically states the hope for the final Christian realization 
on earth. This author believes that Dostoevsky definitely 
entertained the hope for such a result on earth, but that 
some of the more extreme implications of such a stance were 
not taken into consideration by him. Thus, the problem of 
what to do with a murderer was not thought out by Dos­
toevsky because he believed that given the virtual univer­
sality of a Christian mode of being, such acts would not even 
be considered.
Of course, this argument is necessary only if it is 
assumed that physical exclusion of the type practiced in the 
old order was considered prohibited when the Church rules 
in the future. As mentioned, given the ambiguity of Zossima 
and Ivan's language, this is an assumption that we cannot
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be certain of. But whatever type of coercive authority 
Dostoevsky viewed as permissible in the ideal Christian 
state, he did pronounce a new way of viewing the trans­
gressor within a society. A criminal is nothing other 
than a sinner against the Church, or Christian society 
(i.e., himself, man, God and creation) and the only just 
way of handling the situation is to help him to an exis­
tential awareness of his own transgression, through the 
instrument of the human conscience.
Dostoevsky was extremely optimistic as to the ulti­
mate viability of such a system, yet also understood that 
such a system lay more in the future than in the present.
What was said here just now is true too, 
that is, that if the jurisdiction of the 
Church were introduced in practice in its 
full force, that is, if the whole of so­
ciety were changed into the Church, not 
only the judgments of the Church would 
have influence on the reformation of the 
criminal such as it never has now, but 
possibly also the crimes themselves would 
be incredibly diminished... It is true, said 
Zossima with a smile, that Christian society 
now is not ready, and is only now resting 
on some seven righteous men, but as they 
are never lacking, it will continue still 
unshaken in expectation of its complete 
transformation from a society almost hea­
then in character into a single universal 
and all-powerful Church.
30
Proper Attitude toward the Present Political Order 
If "Christian society now is not ready" the question 
remains as to what one’s actions and attitudes should be in 
relation to the present state, in light of the final ideal.
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While Dostoevsky never explicates specifically what one's 
actions or attitudes toward the present state should be, 
he does leave us some room to infer. He also presents some 
inconsistencies.
It appears that, ultimately, Dostoevsky viewed insti­
tutional political forms as almost irrelevant. Therefore, 
one's attitude toward political forms, of themselves, pre­
sent or future, would be almost one of indifference. What 
this means is that one's actions, if they are to lead ul­
timately to a final Christian society, should not be overly 
concerned with either propagating or negating various poli­
tical forms. Political institutions can be viewed as an 
extraneous superstructure which, unfortunately, men take too 
seriously. There is only one way to perceive any government, 
and that is to realize that it is made up of men. Whether 
or not the Church, as society, exists in fact, one must 
operate under the assumption that it does. A state does not 
make political decisions, men do, and such men should be 
treated just like other men. When it comes, the final re­
alization of the ideal will not be a result of coercive 
political force, but will result from the changes within 
men themselves. Therefore, the active Christian must first 
concern himself with teaching men how to be Christian and 
not worry about destroying or creating various political 
structures. The assumption, of course, is that once such 
a mode of being is internalized throughout mankind, that 
which is distasteful in political forms will disappear
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of themselves.
The question still remains as to what specific actions 
are justified, or not justified, given the fact that the 
state often commits evil. Dostoevsky only partially an­
swers this question in the character of Alyosha. We are
confronted with a mode of being that is presented as an
ideal, which, if imitated, will lead to the final realiza­
tion of Christian society. But Alyosha is rarely confronted
with the most difficult of moral decisions and, in ignoring 
this, Dostoevsky does not really let us know how to live 
in a state which does perform violent acts on its members.
We know he is against violent means as a way to attain 
31utopia (as we shall see more fully in the following chap­
ter) , but we are not certain as to the defensive place of 
violence in an evil world. The only time Alyosha is con-
t
fronted with a very difficult moral question, he fails to 
give the proper Christian answer.
'At him!' yells the general, and he set 
the whole pack of hounds on the child.
The hounds catch him, and tear him to 
pieces before his mother's eyes!...I 
believe the general was afterwards de­
clared incapable of administering his 
estates.. Well--what did he deserve?
To be shot? To be shot for the satis­
faction of our moral feelings? Speak 
Alyosha! 'To be shot' murmured Alyosha.
32
How, then, should an individual act in a state that per­
petrates evil upon its members? From the Brothers Karamazov
the answer seems at first to be that one should strive to 
be the ideal Christian in the midst of what is horrible, 
and therefore one should not negate, but merely live the 
affirmative life of a Christian, This humility formula 
seems acceptable in most instances but somehow seems in­
adequate when dealing with violent acts against oneself 
or one's community. Is one allowed to defend oneself or 
one's people through the killing of others? If yes, how 
is this justified in conjunction with the ideal Christian 
formula "each are responsible for all and everything?"
If no, how is one to rationalize the evil not resisted?
What does one do with "the general?" Or more specifically, 
how does one stop him? These are some basic questions 
that Dostoevsky does not come to terms with in the Brothers 
Karamazov. Zossima himself risked his own life in a 
"duel" before he would consent to kill another. He would 
have permitted another to kill him before he would consent 
to kill another person. It is equally as difficult to ima­
gine Alyosha killing another in order to defend himself.
To do so seems inconsistent with the proper Christian 
spirit. But what about protecting another from the vio­
lent onslaught of a person like "the general," or a ruler 
like Stalin? If one lives with a world view as we have 
tried to describe, killing seems unjustified at all costs. 
But there do seem to be situations in which not killing 
results in an evil worse than if a killing were committed. 
It is unfortunate that Alyosha was not confronted with
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such decisions, for his, and Zossima's, apparent radical 
pacifism was not tested in the ultimate of situations.
The political and moral ramifications of radical 
pacifism are potentially devastating. Any group of men 
willing to use violence in the coercion of others could 
dominate a pacifist people. Of course, a response to 
such a critique could be that such induced slavery would 
be trivial in comparison to the shared truth that those 
who supposedly are enslaved share. But it also means 
that mass political murder would have to be tolerated.
Yet in reading the Brothers Karamazov, one does get the. 
definite impression that radical pacifism is part of the 
ideal Christian mode of being, though one is never certain 
because Dostoevsky does not explicate all the moral possi­
bilities. Still it seems justifiable to conclude that 
the Brotilers Karamazov accepts pacifism, though it is seen 
to be a risk. But it is a risk founded in an existential 
faith that makes such a risk comparatively irrelevant.
In spite of the fact that the Brothers Karamazov 
seems to lean toward an acceptance of radical pacifism 
as a proper aspect of the Christian mode of being, in-the 
Diary Dostoevsky apparently takes an entirely opposite 
stand. While still praising universal Christian brother­
hood as the final evolution of man, his tone is less hum­
ble and his means seemingly less Christian. Assuming
that his Interpretation of the war situation with Turkey 
33was correct, Dostoevsky staunchly defended the right of
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a community to go to war to defend itself, especially when
34
the community was a standard bearer of the truth. His ar­
guments seem similar to the standard arguments of all nations, 
i.e., violence, at least In terms of self defense (but 
not aggrandizement) is justified. But even If he felt 
his war position was not inconsistent with the major theme 
of the Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky did not show us why 
this was so. While we have seen that radical pacifism 
creates a problem which a belief in the right of self de­
fense solves, it is up to Dostoevsky to explain how such 
a war view can be justified given the ideal of radical 
humility typified by the statement "each are responsible 
for all and everything." Because Dostoevsky does not do 
this, he leaves us with apparently contradictory ideas. 
Subsequently, we do not have a consistent and thorough 
moral map from Dostoevsky, which otherwise would have 
answered the question of what actions are permissible 
in a state which commits evil upon its members. Rather 
than one answer he left us with two.
In closing this chapter we see that Dostoevsky left us 
some general principles which, if followed, would lead us 
to a final Christian order. He also described, in a gen­
eral manner, what that order would be like. Finally, he 
left us some hints as to how men should regard the pre­
sent imperfect state, in light of the final ideal. We 
have also seen that despite what he did leave us, there 
was also much that he left unsaid.
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CHAPTER IV
REJECTION OF VIOLENCE AS A MEANS TO 
THE IDEAL CHRISTIAN ORDER
...our destiny is universality acquired 
not by the sword but by the force of 
brotherhood and our brotherly longing 
for fellowship of men.^
Christian Means as Christian Ends 
The problem of evil in history and the acceptable 
Christian ways of eradicating it are a definite concern 
to Dostoevsky in his consideration of a proper mode of 
political action. Of all the issues one could write 
about concerning the thought of Dostoevsky, it is the ques­
tion of violence and its role in the establishment of an 
ideal political order which appears most open to possible 
counter interpretations. The question for this chapter is 
to what degree did Dostoevsky sanction the use of violence 
and coercive force in the establishment of the ideal Chris
j
tian order? It is very easy to take some of Dostoevsky's
arguments concerning Russia's war policy and interpret
them to mean that he did conceive of violence as a viable
means in the establishment of the final order. Yet this
author would have to disagree with such a conclusion.
For even in his most rabid war pronouncements, he never
justified violent worldwide coercive measures as a means
to invoke his particular vision of the ideal world.
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He always justified the war in terms of defense and con­
tinued to maintain that the Christian vision could only be 
spread by example and love. It was precisely this type of 
violent action which he attributed to revolutionary groups 
and the Catholic Church and was a primary reason why he was 
so critical of them. So however one might try to draw op­
posite conclusions concerning Dostoevsky's ideas on the 
place of violence in the establishment of the final peace 
on earth, as an idealist Dostoevsky always vehemently op­
posed such arguments. It will be the purpose of this chap­
ter to explore some of the reasons violence.was rejected 
as a means to a Christian finalization; to explore the argu­
ment, as embodied in Ivan, for the acceptance of violence 
and coercion; and to point out how Dostoevsky left us with 
still more inconsistencies and ambiguities concerning his 
thoughts on the place of violence in a Christian mode of 
being.
From a Dostoevskian viewpoint, as we have seen from 
the last chapter, the final world order is reached when the 
Church, or a Christian brotherhood of man, rules over all 
the earth. This will finally occur when all individual men 
freely come together in love and in common worship of a 
loving God. As can easily be seen, the initial problem is 
that if man, with his inherent freedom, never decides freely 
to choose to come together in love and common worship, then 
the ideal order can never be established on earth. In 
other words, as long as men are permitted to deny the Good,
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the Good will never, come about until all men individually
decide that it should come about. Yet it is this position
that Dostoevsky optimistically supports and from which he
criticizes all violent utopian schemes. Not only, then,
did Dostoevsky criticize the goals of the revolutionary
groups of his time, but he also criticized the means by
which they sought to obtain them. He assumed that the
Kingdom of God could not be built by force of empire, but
only by faith, hope and love through the redeeming grace 
2
of Christ. There can be no coercion for the sake of the
3
Good and no earthly power to force subjugation in its name. 
To Dostoevsky, it was the external Christian who only held 
to the word (but in reality is not regenerated internally), 
who is the one likely to propagate the faith by force. This 
critique of coercion was the major force behind the Legend 
of the Grand Inquisitor,^ and was also a dominant theme be­
hind the story of The Possessed.
There are difficulties which arise when one does pro­
claim the ends of a social movement as prior to the means 
by which those ends are achieved. Once one proclaims a 
given end of utmost importance, and likewise believes in a 
cold, logical pursuit of that utopia, almost anything will 
be permitted in light of that given end. As in the personal 
case of Raskolnikov, the great idea commanded all attention 
and service, even if one had to kill in order to remain 
faithful to it. To Dostoevsky, men fell victim to this 
type of attitude when they become abstracted from life
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itself and caught up in the pursuit of that ideal at the 
expense of living it.
It is this type of attitude which Camus satirizes in 
a kind of black humor, though tragic manner, in his play 
Caligula. Camus portrays the absurd consequences that an 
isolated logic can imply when 5_t is carried to the extreme.
The main character of the play,- Caligula, responds to his
subordinate's claim that the Treasury is of utmost impor­
tance :
Now, listen well, you fool! If the Treasury 
has paramount importance, human life has ■ 
none. That should be obvious to you. Peo- 
pie who think like you are bound to admit
the logic of my edict, and since money is the
only thing that counts, we should set no 
value on their lives or anyone elses. I
have the power to enforce my will. Pre­
sently you will see what logic is going to 
cost you. I shall eliminate contradictors.
If necessary, I'll begin with you.j-
One's initial reaction to such a statement is that 
the man is obviously just being sadistic and that he is 
using his superior mind and will to torment those around 
him by turning their own presuppositions against them.
One would probably be correct in that type of interpreta­
tion, but not all logical demands which appear just as
brutal can be considered in that manner. On the contrary,
Caligula shows the potential horror that can be justified 
in the logical pursuit of an end that is considered to be 
of "paramount importance." Despite its sadistic and ab­
surdist overtones, it nevertheless lays out the
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possibilities; and after reading a quote by a real and 
heroically sincere revolutionary, V. I. Lenin, one re­
alizes that' Camus was being no more extreme in his ex­
pression of the potentialities of a revolutionary logic 
driven to the extreme, than was Lenin, an actual success­
ful leader of the revolutionary thrust in Russia. Lenin 
stated in the first months after the Bolshevik coup d'etat:
Why should we be squeamish about the 
sacrifices to our righteous cause?...
It does not matter if three-fourths 
of mankind is destroyed; all that 
counts is that ultimately the last 
quarter should become Communist...
Later centuries will justify the 
cruelties to which circumstances 
have forced us. Then everything will 
be understood, everything.
6
As we can see, the reality takes logic further than 
even Camus' imagination can take us. When logic is carried 
out to such an absurd extent, one's personality is forged 
in dedication to a principle and 'all must be fit into the 
logical scheme. It is more than the pursuit of a mere 
logical idea, it is a dedication that is pushed on by a 
passionate will. In the case of Caligula, his idea is 
pushed on by a deep bitterness; in the case of Lenin we 
see all being justified by History for the sake of a 
glorious future. One is tempted to make the statement 
that leaders of this type are men who either believe 
more than anyone else or disbelieve more than anyone else, 
for their certainty is one that does not hesitate.
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Dostoevsky rarely accused revolutionary idealists of 
being evil men. We have already mentioned that Dostoevsky 
felt many of the young revolutionaries to be of a sincere 
and honest nature. He thought of those in the revolutionary 
movement as misguided idealists, who literally lived in the 
pursuit of an idealistic end. So when Shigalov in The 
Possessed refused to take part in the murder scene, the 
reader finds out that it is not because he has shown com­
passion for Shatov, but rather because the murder did not 
fit into his particular system. Shigalov, too, is an exam­
ple of an attempt to parody this type of mind. He is the 
ultimate believer in the correctness and necessity of his 
goals; and he, therefore, never questions the means by 
which they are pursued. For men -such as he, morality is a 
consideration only when discussing ends, but never when dis­
cussing means. For idealistic goals to remain the ultimate 
good, a certain passion and slightly mad will is needed to 
sustain it. For logic to be king, life has to be sacrificed 
in subordination to it, and it is this which Dostoevsky 
could not sanction.
If the Good cannot be forcibly obtained, then by
necessity there is much evil in the world that the Christian 
7
must accept. He also knows that the world is far from 
being ready freely to choose to come together, in light of 
the Christian truth. In spite of Dostoevsky's declared hopes 
of the Christian communion coming about soon, at least in 
the Slavic world, Zossima1s more sombre remark concerning
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the fact that there are only "seven righteous men in all 
of Russia" is more reflective of Christian realism. The 
world will continue to exist and, for a while at least, 
evil will continue to exist right along with it. But the 
true active Christian cannot commit violent or evil acts in
the pursuit of creating a system in which evil is elimi-.
nated. Yet either way the Christian seems to lose. If he
does nothing, the evil remains; and if he uses violence, he
becomes the perpetrator of evil. The solution lies in some­
how trying to eradicate the evil while avoiding all pi't- 
falls that merely would add to the dilemma.
For a Christian, the same ideals must be followed in
the pursuit of a given ideal as in the mode of being of
8the ideal itself. The Dostoevskian assumption is that 
when one kills from a Christian commitment, he is in fact 
already denying that commitment. For a Christian, con­
siderations of agape should supercede all other consider­
ations.^ If the Christian do'es not kill, it often appears 
that everything will go on the same; yet if he does kill, 
he destroys the very foundation that the future of his 
ideal is set upon.
Men can never deify the future by sacrificing in­
dividual men for the future's revival. If he does so, then 
the Christian is acting in a paradoxi-cal manner. That 
which begins as a protest against suffering, ends by pro­
moting the very suffering he has vowed to eradicate. The 
danger is that the utopian ideal will become an end in it­
self beyond and above the values of humanity. The Grand
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inquisitor has renounced any eternal value in the name 
of historical harmony only. For the Christian, the only 
absolute principle is that of agape which, when it becomes 
universal, will lead to that utopia which violent action 
tries to bring about through coercion. But for Dostoevsky, 
utopia could never be brought about by f o r c e . F o r  him, 
the ideal future - can only be brought about by living the 
ideal in the present. Before there can be universal brother­
hood, all men must, in fact, become as brothers. Coercion 
can. never change the internal relations between men and 
can only succeed in bringing about, as in The Grand 
Inquisitor, the huddled fear of Seville. For Dostoevsky, 
Christian love set limits to human behavior; he therefore 
rejected murder and, subsequently, revolutionary action 
as proper Christian vehicles. It was in this sense that 
Dostoevsky believed that there was no final political
solution outside of the religious internal solution to
11man's dilemma. A Christian is not historically oriented
in the sense that he gives ultimate meaning to a final
historical condition beyond what that condition means to
individual men. A political revolutionary works against
the past for the future, while a Christian works in the
12present out of love for God. and his fellow man.
Therefore, the Christian must to some extent accept 
the existence of suffering in the world as inevitable, that 
is, until the final realization of the Christian community.
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In the theories of Shigalov and the Grand Inquisitor, the 
assumption is that one must coerce people in order to re­
move suffering from the world. But Christianity is con­
cerned with the spiritual revolution and accepts the in­
evitability of evil in the world, while at the same time 
rejecting it as contrary to the will of God. In order for 
men to ever reach a Christian ideal, they must have the 
freedom to reject it, or that very ideal becomes an 
impossibility. The type of coercion practiced by all 
revolutionary and totalitarian groups runs counter to this 
idea.
The only question that remains is to what degree did 
Christians have to accept evil according to Dostoevsky?
To put it in a simple and straightforward form, would a 
Christian be allowed to kill in order to prevent the murder 
of .a child, if killing were the only possible way? While 
such a question may seem like a simple moral problem, its 
solution is very basic to what Dostoevsky considered the 
proper mode of being for a Christian. If the answer were 
yes, then from that first step one could draw up a whole 
system justifying violence in the defense of human life.
Such a justification would ,have obvious political ramifi­
cations, especially when the state is the initiator of the 
violence.
But such specific questions are not answered by 
Dostoevsky. While violence for the sake of defense is an 
issue in the Diary, it is not in the Brothers Karamazov, and
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it is the latter book in which a Christian mode of being 
is explicitly presented. If Dostoevsky did consider vio­
lence as having some place in the Christian mode of being, 
he never gave an explicit justification for it in terms 
of agape.
But since we can be sure that Dostoevsky always 
criticized the use of violence in the creation of the 
ideal order, it means that given the nature of the world, 
there will at least be some evil which the Christian must 
tolerate. Until the final Christian realization becomes 
fact, man's freedom will always lead to certain iniquities 
or horrors--unless freedom of action and thought are 
totally annulled through the creation of a totalitarian 
state. By the very nature of God's world, man is free 
to commit evil. It is this fact which Ivan Karamazov 
cannot accept. He views the world as meaningless in its 
essence and opts instead for the 'totalitarian state of 
the Inquisitor. Rather than the non-violent means of 
Zossima or Alyosha, Ivan chooses violent coercion, both 
in the establishment and operation of the final world order.
Ivan's Rebellion
There's a book here in which I read about 
.the trial of a Jeto, who took a child of 
four years old and cut off the fingers 
from both hands, and then crucified him 
on the wall, hammered nails into him and 
crucified him, and afterwards, when he 
was tried, he said that the child died 
soon, within four hours. That was soon!
He said that the child moaned, kept on 
moaning and he stood admiring him...
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Sometimes I imagine that it was I who 
crucified him. He would hang there 
moaning and I would sit. opposite him 
eating pineapple compote. I am awfully 
fond of pineapple compote. Do you like 
it?
13
It’s not that I don’t accept God, you 
must understand, it’s the world created 
by Him I don't and cannot accept. Let 
me make it plain. I believe like a 
child that suffering will be healed and 
made up for, that all the humiliating 
absurdity of human contradictions will 
vanish like a pitiful mirage, like the 
despicable fabrication of the impotent 
and infinitely small Euclidian mind of 
man, that in the world’s finale, at the 
moment of eternal harmony, something so 
precious will come to pass that it will 
suffice for all hearts, for the comfor­
ting of all resentments...(it will make 
possible the justification) of all that 
has happened with men--but though all 
that may come to pass, I don't accept 
it. I won't accept it.
14
Within Ivan Karamazov, the metaphysical star of 
Dostoevsky's Brothers Karamazov,one finds an embodiment 
of the struggle between the search for ultimate reality 
and the demands of earthly ’’bread." Through him we see 
all the salient issues that have to do with the ultimate 
justification of seeking truth, and what this truth must 
necessarily entail. The solving of his dilemma will be 
one of either accepting the beatific vision of harmony 
or rejecting it in the name' of justice on earth. Or to 
put it even more simply, it is a question of accepting 
God or accepting the goals and tenets of a socialist 
revolution. It is in Ivan that we see Dostoevsky’s true
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understanding of the issues on a much deeper plane than 
most of the socialists of his era understood. In Ivan 
we have a rejection, not of the dogmatic assertion of God, 
but rather of the universal harmony and bliss of his 
creation at the end of time. Ivan is actually torn be­
tween the acceptance or rejection of a Christian mode of 
being with full understanding and knowledge, because he 
feels the price that man has to pay is too high. He bases 
his defense, not on man who has a free choice to accept 
or reject and suffer the consequences, but on the suffering 
of innocent children who by the very nature of freedom are 
destined to suffer by man's choice of evil. Ivan rejects 
the very meaning of God's creation and dedicates himself 
to a new order in which the innocents will not be forced 
to suffer. For him the basic question is: How can one
find meaning in a creation in which innocents are treated 
so cruelly?
Ellis Sandoz gives his interpretation of Ivan's re­
bellion in his book Political Apocalypse. He describes 
Ivan as being endowed with feeling, a sympathy of a gran­
diose and all embracing kind of idealism and nobility of 
soul. What he lacks is faith in the significance of ex­
istence as given. It is not that he rejects God, but in­
stead he challenges him by denying the order of His creation 
and His revelation in Christ.^ What is fantastic about 
this rejection and makes it so much more powerful than any 
so-called normal rejection is that he does so with full
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knowledge of what he is rejecting. Ivan’s rebellion is 
not just against earthly authority, but it is a revolt 
against what IS. In a way it is a pride that borders on 
insanity and Dostoevsky means to show this by Ivan's men­
tal breakdown before and after Dmitri's trial. Ivan ac­
cepts the divinity and is even moved by the encounter, 
and yet "he adhers to his idea."
16Salvation is a process of becoming divine, yet 
Ivan still rejects it in the name of a more just system.
He rejects it because built into the basic harmony of the 
universe is the freedom of man. This freedom means that 
man can choose to ignore and escape from the implications 
of a joyous affirmation of life. The irnplication man fears 
the most is the full acceptance of his own physical death 
as part of the harmony of life. He rejects all of life in 
the. attempt to find security in an isolated personal life.
In his rejection, which is ultimately a free choice, man 
loses his awareness and can be seduced by ideas, money, com­
fort, sex, cruelty and anything else which will help keep 
his awareness of the rejection repressed. As a result, man, 
in his blindness and freedom, sometimes commits cruelties 
against innocent children. By the very nature of the uni­
verse and by the very nature of man's freedom, this is 
"allowed" to happen. It is in defense of these innocent 
children,whom Ivan claims should not have to suffer, that 
he bases his whole rebellion against God. Because men are 
weak, they continue to perpetrate evil on each other in an
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endless round of ignoring the Good. Ivan can accept the 
fact that free men suffer at each other’s hand. Generally 
speaking he does not consider such suffering to be a case 
of divine injustice for he believes man has denied himself 
salvation through his own free will; i.e., if man suffers, 
he does so because of his own sin. But Ivan cannot accept 
the fact that the children must suffer for the sins of
adults, for it is the children who are free of all sin.
If they, (the children) too, suffer
horribly on earth, they must suffer
for their fathers' sins; they must 
be punished for their fathers who 
have eaten the apple: this reasoning
is of the other world and is incompre­
hensible for the heart of man here on 
earth. The innocent must not suffer 
for another man's sins and especially 
such innocents!
17
I say nothing of the grown up people, 
they have eaten the apple, damn them 
and the devil take them all! But these 
little ones!
18
Since the ultimate truth and harmony is based on 
the free acquiescence of the self to life and all its 
manifestations, it follows that everything must be freely 
accepted, even the death of oneself. One can only live 
life, says Dostoevsky, by loving, accepting and forgiving. 
Ivan can accept the fact that men suffer because they have 
knowledge of good and evil, but he asks, why must the 
children suffer? What have they to do with- the knowledge 
of good and evil? If man must be free in order to take
part in the eternal harmony, then Ivan claims that it is 
not worth it. Says Ivan to Alyosha,
Imagine that you are creating a fabric 
of human destiny with the object of making 
men happy in the end, giving them peace 
and rest at last, but that it was essential 
and inevitable to torture to death only one 
tiny creature--that baby beating its breast 
with its fist, for instance--and to found 
that edifice on its unavenged tears, would 
you consent to be the architect on those 
conditions? Tell me, and tell me the truth.
No I wouldn't consent, said Alyosha softly.
19
Ivan could not accept the fact that man's place in 
the eternal scheme of things had to include the possibility 
of evil being done to the innocents. Ivan could never jus­
tify this, even if at the end of creation all sinners and 
those sinned•against stand up and embrace, rejoicing in 
the revealed word of God. He will not accept the terms
9
of existence if it is dependent on such precepts.
Ivan did not believe that divine harmony was capable
of reconciling man's injustice to man, and so in the
absence of eternal harmony, man is forced back to a
purely temporal solution: the ecclesiastical justice of
the Grand Inquisitor. The enforced harmony of the state
20takes over from divine harmony.
In his Legend Ivan renounces the Christian goal of 
spreading brotherhood through active love (as embodied in 
Alyosha) and chooses instead a totalitarian world order 
to put man into line. Though at the expense of man's 
freedom and salvation, the price is not too high.
God's world is already absurd to Ivan. His solution, 
apparently, will at least lead to the eradication of 
evil done to innocents; in that sense it is better than 
the world God offered man. Man is too weak to handle the 
responsibility of his freedom, so Ivan does the world a 
favor by taking that freedom away from him.
Of course, Dostoevsky rejects Ivan's solution. He 
does so not by argumentation or explanation (for those 
are the tools of the rational mind), rather he rejects 
it in favor of faith in God's creation and a deep love 
for man. He rejects it in favor of trying to make all 
men as brothers, freely choosing to expiate their sins 
by sharing in the guilt of mankind's past offenses and 
by coming together in Christian love. Dostoevsky's res­
ponse to Ivan is faith and love, thus Christ's kiss to 
the Inquisitor mirrored by Alyosha's kiss to Ivan. In 
that kiss we have Dostoevsky's affirmation of faith in 
the "internal" Christian revolution. Faith in God and 
the meaning of his universe makes Ivan's solution 
untenable.
Violence and Self Defense
This chapter has tried to discuss the type of actions 
that Dostoevsky considered wrong in the pursuit of the 
Christian ideal and also the rationalistic moralistic ar­
gument, as embodied in Ivan, that denies the validity of 
that stance. It has tried to show that Dostoevsky believed
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violence and murder to be wrong when used in the pursuit 
of the ideal order. But, unfortunately, this still does 
not answer all the questions concerning what Dostoevsky 
considered to be the proper Christian parameters for poli­
tical action. So far I have been operating under the as­
sumption that the active pursuit of a stated moral end, 
and self defense (individually or communally) in the face 
of evil, are two completely separate types of activities.
I have made this separation because Dostoevsky apparently 
made the same separation--Dostoevsky vehemently supported 
Russia's involvement in a war with Turkey as an example 
of self defense for a truth-bearing people, but he ve­
hemently opposed the idea that a nation (particularly 
Russia) had a right to coerce people- through violence in 
order to establish a certain moral order.
The problem is that the two types of activities are 
not as completely separated as they might first seem.
But before the argument is continued it must be stated 
that it would not be necessary in the first place if it 
were not for Dostoevsky's war policy. We have already 
stated that it seemed incongruous with the type of Chris­
tian mode of being pronounced in the Brothers Karamazov.
We have also stated in the previous chapter that the 
radical pacifism that appeared to be Idealized in the 
Brothers Karamazov would lead to problems that would be 
solved if killing in self defense could be accepted as
justifiable. But this is not an issue in the Brothers 
Karamazov and the only time it becomes an issue for Dos­
toevsky is in the Diary. The problem is that the two 
modes of being are not put in synchronization, and upon 
reading the Diary and the Brothers Karamazov, the reader 
is left confused as to the place of violence, if any, in 
a Christian mode of being. In this chapter I have dis­
cussed Dostoevsky's critique of violent modes of being to 
reach a utopian end, ignoring his declared "defensive" 
war policy under the assumption that defensive acts of 
violence are different from those which.seek a change in 
the political system. But besides the ambiguity that al­
ready exists in Dostoevsky's thought concerning the place 
of violence in self defense, we now have the added ambi­
guity which results from the fact that defensive measures 
cannot always be so clearly separated from "offensive" 
ones. For example, if a dictator, such as Stalin, were 
to decide to eradicate half of Russia, wouldn't the only 
defense be the active violent overthrowing of his regime 
in the name of a higher moral standard? We would have the 
problem of calling a revolution a defensive act. We can 
look to Dostoevsky and ,find completely opposite answers 
as to the proper solution to the problem of a Stalin-type 
bloodbath. On the one hand, we can look to his war policy 
as a precedent for the use of violence; yet on the other 
hand,we can look to Zossima and the many pronouncements 
in the Diary as precedent for denouncing the use of violence
10 1 .
in the name of a higher moral order.
Dostoevsky could have solved this problem by stating
exactly when violence was permissible and why. Instead
he simultaneously declared it impermissible in the ideal
of Zossima and in his pronouncements against coercion as
a viable means to utopia, while at the same time declaring
that "war is not always a scourge, sometimes it is sal- 
21vation," We can only conclude that Dostoevsky never 
clearly thought out (either that or never accepted) the 
various ramifications of the Christian mode of being he 
idealized in the Brothers Karamazov, nor did he clear iy 
think out the ramifications of declaring a war policy 
justifiable while also claiming that morality and brother­
hood can never be coercively established.
Unfortunately there is no final statement that can
be made about Dostoevsky’s ideas on the place of violence
\
and coercion in a Christian mode of being. He never speci­
fies in a consistent fashion when, if ever, it is permis­
sible. The reader is left to draw various conclusions 
from varying images. We know he believed that violence 
could never be used to establish his Christian ideal, .but 
implied in any defense against violence is the assumption 
that one is fighting for, if only out of necessity, the establish­
ment of a higher moral order. Things would have been simpler for the 
student of Dostoevsky if Dostoevsky were against the Russian-Turkish 
war, as was Tolstoi. Then the logical step could easily be
made from the Brothers Karamazov that radical Christian 
pacifism is necessarily part of the Christian mode of being. 
Though the ramifications would be obvious, at least it would 
have been comprehensible given the fact of Christ. From 
that we could clearly see why coercion and violence could 
never be justified. But this is not the case, and the 
student is left without a comprehensible moral system. He 
is left trying to decipher what appears to be a peculiar 
code--only to come up empty handed.
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Chapter V 
RUSSIA; THE HISTORICAL SAVIOR
We should become convinced that the 
genuine social truth resides in no 
one else but our people, that their 
idea, their spirit contains the living 
urge of universal communion of men.
1
Five Themes from the 'Diary of a Writer1 
In spite of Dostoevsky's apparent uncertainty and con­
fusion about the place of violence in a Christian mode of 
being, he tries to justify the Russian-Turkish war through 
his belief that the Russian people were the standard bearers 
of the Christian truth. Dostoevsky not only believed that 
man should seek the Christian ideal and that ultimately it 
would be attained on this earth, but he also believed that 
Russia, in union with her Slavic brothers, would be the 
historical link to the final Christian realization of man­
kind. This theme was a dominant one throughout his works.
It is the prophetic message that lies "hidden" in The 
Possessed, and it is the overt message that is written on 
virtually every page of the Diary of a Writer.
When writing about the political thought of Dostoevsky, 
one cannot exclude the messianic aspect of his message.
One cannot extract what one likes from his thought and then
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explain away the,rest in a footnote. It is often the 
case that a critic will expound on Dostoevsky’s ideas, 
while barely acknowledging his belief in Russia as the 
carrier of the world ideal. He is often seen as a 
Christian idealist who unfortunately happened to get 
carried away by a nationalistic fervor. But if one is 
going to consider all aspects of his political thinking, 
it is impossible to ignore his ideas on Russia's special 
role in the universal scheme of things. By discounting 
his nationalism, one is ignoring one of his most passion­
ate themes, and by doing so one perceives only an altered 
vision of Dostoevsky’s thought. It is for this reason 
that I have devoted a chapter to his nationalistic beliefs, 
and see them not as an anomaly but rather as an integral 
part of his thought.
There are six major themes which are dominant through-
3
out the Diary, his most representative nationalistic work. 
The first theme stresses Russia’s particular place in his­
tory as a peaceful server of mankind and her messianic duty 
as the unifier and leader of the world. The second theme 
emphasizes Russia's internal consensus and inward unifica­
tion as opposed to Europe's dissension and corrosion. The 
third theme concerns itself with the peculiar Russian 
ability for universal consciousness; while the fourth 
theme calls for the Russian intelligentsia to turn from 
its Western ways and once again reunite with the common 
people. The fifth theme deals with Dostoevsky’s particular
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anti-Western attitude; and the sixth theme points out 
the need for a Pan-Slavic union, including Russian control 
of Constantinople.
It should be relatively clear by now how Dostoevsky 
felt about the importance of religion for the life, of a 
people. What may not be as clear is the historical im­
portance Dostoevsky placed in Russia's action or being 
as a nation. Russia was the bed of Orthodoxy, and there­
fore, the bearer of the "new word." But unlike some 
other nationalistic beliefs in the greatness of one's 
own nation, Dostoevsky did not believe Russia's truth 
could either be segregated from other nations or forced 
upon them through violence. It was by the very nature of 
her truth that such attitudes were precluded. Russia 
sought not to conquer the world, but only brotherly com­
munion with all other nations.
...Not only shall we not seize and take 
away anything from Europe, but the fact 
itself that we shall greatly strengthen 
ourselves (through the alliance of love 
and brotherhood) will, finally, enable 
us not to draw the sword...but to reveal 
an example of sincere peace.
4
In proclaiming Russia's power and defending her ac­
tion against the Turks, Dostoevsky points out that Russia's 
desires as a nation were not political, but rather religious in 
nature. Europe feared Russia as a nation because she had 
consistently misunderstood her intentions. Russia's first 
and primary interest was to serve man in the true spirit of
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Christian brotherhood. Russia’s messianism is taught by
5
example and not by the sword. Her most important interest
as a nation was this religious and universal quest for com-
munion of all men, for just as the solution to a nation1"
political problems is solved through a Christian mode of
6being, so also are the world's political problems.
We shall be the first to announce to the 
world that we seek to achieve our own wel­
fare, not through the suppression of na­
tional individualities alien to u s , but on 
the.contrary, that we perceive our welfare 
in the freest and most independent develop­
ment of all other nations and in brotherly 
communion with them.
7
Russia, will be the first to reach out her hands toward 
Europe and she “shall maintain spiritual intercourse with 
them, teaching them and learning from them, up to the time 
when mankind, as a grand and beautiful tree, having at­
tained full maturity and universal brotherhood with the 
fellowship of all peoples, shades with itself the happy 
earth.
The reason Europe should never fear Russia as an
enemy is that Russia was already at peace with herself.
Outside of the small intelligentsia, Russia already had
9
a true political unity. She, therefore, did not need to 
sublimate an inner confusion toward a falsely proclaimed 
external enemy. From Dostoevsky's eyes, the Christian 
ideal and vision had so permeated the Russian spirit that
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he conceived of Russia as the most democratic and unified 
of all nations. Because he conceived her demos to be con­
tented, as opposed to Europe's unsatisfied proletarians, 
Russia was destined to prove stronger than any other na­
tion in Europe. Europe, because of her lack of true re­
ligious spirit, will be destroyed, but not by the Russia 
she unjustly fears. Rather by the
unsatisfied democratic tendencies of an 
enormous portion of their lower class sub- 
jects--their proletarians and paupers...In 
Russia this cannot happen, our demos is 
content and, as time goes on, it will grow 
even more content because everything tends 
toward this condition...And, therefore, 
there will remain on the continent but one 
colossus---Russia.
10
Russia is not only the light of the world, but the 
rest of the world (most specifically Europe), through 
its failure to understand the true nature of the pro­
per spirit of man, will collapse of its own accord.
Of course, Russia does not rejoice at such prospects,
for her final happiness is dependent on the happiness of
the rest of the world. Only in Russia is there a universal
consciousness. Dostoevsky believed that one of the ways
this was reflected was the fact that only Russia was able
to understand the art of all other nations, while her art
11was not truly understood in other parts of the world.
The most universal of artists in this homeland of univer- 
salists was Pushkin--to Dostoevsky a prophet who first
understood Russia’s historical mission. It was he above 
all others who realized "the fact that the conception of
the universality of man is the principle personal charac-
12teristic and designation of a Russian." Pushkin was the 
universal genius who realized that the ultimate goal of 
Russian life was to seek harmony with all men. He was 
representattive of the Russian faculty for universalism.
Pushkin was also the first to realize that the in­
telligentsia in Russia had gone astray by looking toward 
Europe for her spiritual leadership when the truth lay 
within her bosom. It was in the Russian peasant's unques­
tioning and uncynical faith that truth lay. It was the 
responsibility of the intelligentsia to shake their pride 
and to bow down to the people in symbolic acquiescence to 
their humble yet ultimate truth. As early as 1860, with
the publication of Time, his ideas of the peasant as the
' 13life-giving force was evident. He believed that once
one was uprooted from the soil, as was the intelligentsia,
14one became only a parody of oneself. For Dostoevsky, 
all of Russia’s internal problems could be traced to the 
intelligentsia's divorcing itself from the truth of the 
common people. In his novels, Stavrogin and Ivan are two 
characters who epitomize the disease Dostoevsky felt was 
most endemic to the intelligentsia. To this wayward class 
Dostoevsky pleads, "believe in the people's spirit, await
.|15salvation from it alone, and you will be saved."
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At first it might seem that such nationalistic pro­
clamations by Dostoevsky are really nothing more than re­
marks of a.most chauvinistic kind. While this is partially 
true, it does not tell the whole story. From his way of 
thinking, being a staunch Russian "nationalist" really 
meant nothing- more than being a universalist. A true 
Russian, such as Zossima and Alyosha, seeks after the bro­
therhood of all men with faith in Jesus Christ and a living 
vision of the paradise that is earth. In his ideal he is 
anything but a chauvinist, although in his perception of 
who alone was the guardian of this ideal one must conclude 
that he was- overly optimistic as to Russia's place in the 
universal scheme of things. Though he sometimes seems 
more concerned with how great Russia is because of her 
universalism, rather than universalism itself, still, as 
an ideal, he never abandons the notion of universal brother­
hood.
While criticizing the intelligentsia, Dostoevsky did
/
not conclude that they had nothing to offer Russia. While 
the people were the bearers of the "new word" it was the 
intelligentsia who perceived their mission of renewing 
humanity. Each class had something to give to the other 
and it was only in the separation of these two classes 
that Russia lacked absolute unity. To his dying day, es­
pecially in the famed Pushkin speech, Dostoevsky called 
for the reconciliation of the two classes. But before this 
could occur the intelligentsia would have to abandon all
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rationalistic theories of the West and return to the truth 
of her people. Rationalism, when taken to the extreme,
16leads, only to cynicism, doubt, and separation from God. 
Socialists, and all "Western" thinkers, who believed that 
a material world of comfort and plenty could be created, 
were not wrong because of what they included in their 
ideals, but were.wrong because of what they excluded. In 
denying anything transcendent, Dostoevsky believed they 
denied that which led to an existential comprehension of 
the divine and sublime in life. By being mundane, ra­
tionalism, and more specifically the utilitarian philoso­
phies, denied the source of all truth; and by denying the 
source, denied all beauty and human harmony which were 
consequences of faith in a loving God. When a society has 
an ideal which denies the transcendent/immanent God, it 
can at best.live only in mechanical efficiency, and no true 
brotherhood could be achieved.
Dostoevsky sometimes criticized Russian intellectuals' 
interpretations of "Western" theories even more severely 
than those theories themselves. What the West put forth 
seriously as scientific hypotheses (eg., Darwin's theory 
of evolution) Russia took as final dogmas. It is impor­
tant to realize that Dostoevsky was not against ra­
tionalistic or scientific thought per se. What he criti­
cized was science's oft assumed stance that, it had a final 
say as to the nature of all things. Reason was never superior
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to faith, more specifically the faith of the Russian people; 
and once the intelligentsia realized that the faith of the 
Russian people was superior to reason, Russia would finally 
be able to serve its messianic ideal.
Nationalism and 1 The Possessed1 
The Possessed is the novel most concerned with Russia's 
special position in relation to the rest of the world. It 
can be interpreted on several different levels. On one level 
it can be seen as a pamphlet against the radical spirit in 
Russia. While this is one way of viewing the book, it is 
not altogether fair to see Dostoevsky as just a petty paro­
dist of the revolutionary mind. Dostoevsky, in reality, was 
far more sympathetic to the revolutionary spirit than The
1 ~j
Possessed might indicate. On another level, the novel can
be viewed as a book which means to show all the nihilistic
possiblilites which seem unassailable once one has denied
the existence of God, Finally, The Possessed can be seen
as a symbolic prophetic statement as to the historical des-
18tiny of Russia. It is this level which is most relevant
to our discussion of Dostoevsky’s nationalism.
The key to the interpretation of The Possessed as a
*
symbolic prophetic statement concerning the historical des­
tiny of Russia lies in the Biblical quote that appears through­
out the book:
And there was there a herd of many swine 
feeding on the mountain: and they besought
him that he would suffer them to enter in
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them. And he suffered them. Then went the 
devils out of the man, and entered into the 
swine; and the herd ran violently down the 
steep place into the lake and were choked.
When they that fed them saw what was done, 
they fled, and went and told it in the city 
and in the country. Then they went out to 
see what was done; and came to Jesus, and 
found the man, out of whom the devils were 
departed, sitting at the feet of Jesus, 
clothed, and in his right mind: and they
were afraid.
19
Of course, the sick man is Russia and the devils are the 
false ideas that threaten to destroy her. But Russia will 
not be destroyed. Like the sick man in the Bible, "the 
Great Idea and the Great Will" protects her from above and 
eventually the sick man, Russia, "will recover and sit at 
the feet of Jesus." The Possessed also means to predict 
that Russia will weather the invasion of atheistic and 
nihilistic ideas, and in the end her faith will be pure-- 
she will serve as the spiritual leader for mankind.
There is one section of The Possessed that does not re­
present Dostoevsky's nationalistic ideas--that dealing with 
the character of Shatov. It is sometimes assumed that Shatov 
speaks for Dostoevsky when he airs his opinions to Stavrogin 
at the former's home. But in studying closely what Shatov 
has to say, one finds that his brand of nationalism is far 
more extreme and chauvinistic than Dostoevsky's stated uni­
versalism. Putting it another way, if Dostoevsky did at 
one time subscribe to the ideas put forth by Shatov, then 
he changed his mind over the next eight years in his Diary 
of a Writer.
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Shatov believed, that each nation has its own. God, be­
cause God is a synthesis of the entire history of a nation.
The objective of all national movements is the search for God. 
Each nation has its own idea of good and evil which cannot be 
distinguished by reason alone, but must be interpreted from 
the culture and tradition of the nation. Once nationhood 
breaks down, good and evil become impossible to distinguish 
because the very distinguishing measure of good and evil, 
nationhood, is in disarray. A nation is a nation only as 
long as it believes only in its own God. Great nations al­
so believe they can save the whole world.
While there is an obvious similarity between the na­
tionalistic ideas of Shatov and the ideas of Dostoevsky, 
there is a decided difference in emphasis between them.
Shatov emphasizes the culture and tradition of a nation as 
causal factors. By going so far as to define God as a syn­
thesis of the personality of an entire nation, Shatov suc­
cumbs to the most blatant kind of relativism. Stavrogin's 
criticism of Shatov strikes home when he accuses Shatov of 
"boiling God down to a mere national‘attribute." With Shatov, 
the nation that is greatest actually creates the image of God; 
which is to say patriotic nationalism is prior to religious 
faith.
Dostoevsky’s ideas differ in two respects. First, he 
did not define God as the synthesis of a nation's personality, 
rather he did just the opposite. The nation's personality 
is a function of its true perception of the meaning of a
1 16 .
transcendent and loving God. Secondly, Dostoevsky praised 
the greatness of Russia, not as a nation that needs to con­
quer other nations by means of her superior stance in rela­
tion to the rest of the world, but as a nation which alone 
realized that nationalistic traits should never serve as 
a wall between two peoples. In other words, he perceived 
an essence of man that transcended both the culture and 
tradition of a nation and enabled all men to be brothers 
in spite of cultural differences. In contradistinction to 
Shatov, Dostoevsky did not see culture and tradition as the 
ultimate measure of a people. Dostoevsky was a universa- 
list and his universalism was based on the belief in man's 
intrinsic capability of perceiving through faith the divine 
nature in all things. It just so happens that Russia was, to 
Dostoevsky, the only nation to understand the universal na­
ture of all things. As an ideal, Dostoevsky did not pro­
claim that all people believe in ‘Russia's truth; the reason 
being.that it was not Russia's truth to begin with, but uni­
versal truth. Russia was a great nation because she stayed 
true to the Orthodox spirit by keeping a living image of 
Christ in her midst. Russia did not create the truth, as 
Shatov implies, but instead merely stands true before its 
light.
One Final Theme from the 'Diary'
There is still one theme of Dostoevsky's Diary that we 
have yet to cover and that is his belief in the necessity
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of a Pan-Slavic union. Despite Dostoevsky's continued in­
sistence on Russia as being in the service of mankind, and 
despite his desire to accomplish Russia's glorious ends in 
a peaceful and exemplary manner only, Dostoevsky, neverthe­
less, was an ardent supporter of the revolt of the Balkan 
Slavs who had risen against their Turkish oppressors.
Great support was spreading for the Serbian forces through­
out Russia. Collections were being taken up for the victims 
of the war and many men were joining in the fight itself.
From Dostoevsky's point of view, the war had world his­
torical significance. He believed that the spirit that 
swept Russia during the war was indicative of her unifica­
tion in Christ. He did not view the war in political terms, 
but saw it as a great religious struggle. He even believed
the war was causing the gap to close between the masses and
20the intelligentsia. This Pan-Slav movement was proof of
the fact that deep within the spirit of the nation there
21was a thirst for suffering and good cause. The war was 
supported so strongly because the Russian people intui­
tively understood the importance of protecting Orthodoxy 
and thereby achieving a union of all Orthodox Christians.
Such an intuition was strong indication that a new era 
was dawning in which Russia would be the guiding light of 
the world.
The war was an extraordinary moral stimulus to 
Dostoevsky, in spite of everything else he had written which 
seemed to go directly counter to it:
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Lasting peace always generates cruelty, 
cowardice and coarse fat egoism, and 
chiefly~- intellectual stagnation. It 
is only the exploiters of the people 
who grow fat in times of long peace... 
such a war merely clears the air con­
taminated with soot, cures the soul, 
chases away cowardice and indolence, 
sets forth and proclaims a firm aim, 
launches and clarifies the idea which 
this or that'nation must put into 
effect.
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It is hard to imagine that an author of universal brother­
hood, and the man who wrote so vehemently against forced 
union, could also proclaim so passionately the benefits of 
war. It must, nevertheless, be understood that Dostoevsky 
never perceived the war as a coercive spreading of the Or­
thodox faith. Rather, he believed that the war was neces­
sary for the protection of the Pan-Slav-Orthodox union, 
which once established would provide the first step toward 
uniting mankind in Christ. As mentioned in Chapter Three, 
such an argument may not seem consistent with the Christian 
mode of being as presented in the Brother Karamazov, but at 
least it does not go to the extreme of declaring it righteous 
to coerce people into the faith. Dostoevsky believed that 
once the Pan-Slav union was established, the world would
see an example "not of a political federation based on self
23interest, but a true confraternity of peoples."
Dostoevsky believed the war would lead to a whole re­
alignment of world powers--from this war would spring a 
European war. His logic was that France, seeing that Russia 
had her hands full in the east, would be influenced by the
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Jesuits into attacking Germany, supposedly Russia’s ally.^
France would be defeated, and then the Pope, being the
power monger that he was, would make common cause with the
masses and their leaders. "He will come before the people
walking barefoot, hand Christ over to the socialists, sane-
25tioning the use of force, and offer to head the rebels."
We have already described in the first chapter Dostoevsky's 
psychological interpretation of what the masses will do 
when all order is torn asunder: they will accept any
leadership offered them at first chance, for anything will 
be seenas better than living in a state of anarchy. This 
is the essence of the Western way of politics, especially 
as conceived by the Catholic Church. Europe stands torn 
apart, threatened by the anti-Christ; Russia stands alone, 
a symbol and an embodiment of unification in Christ. Her 
demos is content because she alone lives in the light of 
the Christian spirit.
After Russia has won the war, she also will have to 
concern herself with the problem of the acquisition of 
Constantinople. What he criticizes as evil in the Catholic 
Church seems to be what he proclaims as proper for Russia.
To quote Avraham Yarmolinsky:
This apostle of humility championed an ar­
rant Messianism and, in preaching Christian 
brotherhood, bristled like the veriest jingo.
D. H. Lawrence said of him that while "pro­
fessing love, all love," his nose was "sharp 
with hate" and his running "shadowy and rat­
like." This is an apt description of the 
man revealed at his worst, in the Diary.
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The very writing is so often evasive, 
slippery, unctious, snarling.
26
While this remark by Yarmolinsky may be understandable, 
it must also be kept in mind that Dostoevsky felt that such 
a war was for a glorious end, not only for Russia, but for 
the whole world. Despite how incongruous it may have been, 
Dostoevsky still did not envision the taking of Constanti­
nople as a coercive spreading of the Russian faith. However 
one might scrutinize his own particular judgment of the 
matter, he envisioned the taking of Constantinople as merely 
the final political/religious consolidation of an Orthodox 
communion that already existed and which was being threatened 
by political oppression from an alien government. It was 
only a protecting of a religious community which once finally 
consolidated would then stand as the spiritual and moral ex­
ample for the rest of the world. Coercion was never con­
ceded by Dostoevsky to be the way to world brotherhood.
Nevertheless, Dostoevsky's- major fault in his war 
pronouncements was not that he was stating a means so 
drastically different than other idealist nationalistic 
or revolutionary groups in the past, but that it seemed to 
go against his own self-proclaimed morally high standards.
With this note in mind, we end this chapter with a quote 
from Sigmund Freud which seems more conclusive and sympa­
thetic than Yarmolinsky's :
Dostoevsky threw away the chance of be 
coming a teacher and liberator of man­
kind and made himself one with its 
gaolers... The greatness of his intelli 
gence and the strength of his love for 
mankind might have opened to him an­
other, an apostolic, way of life.
27
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CONCLUSION
Man would sooner have the void for purpose 
than be void of purpose.
1
One feels the necessity of trying to justify why the 
study of a man long dead is a worthwhile activity, even if 
only potentially so. When asked why doing a thesis on Dos­
toevsky is a significant activity (as I have often been 
asked), one is forced to stop and think about one’s own 
motives, feelings, and beliefs. It is not an exaggeration 
to 'say that one really has to question the whole meaning 
and direction of one’s life in order to answer such a ques­
tion honestly. It does not do the question justice to pro­
claim one’s ’Interest” and’’enjoyment’’ 'ill" dissecting, inter­
preting and imagining the author’s particular world view. 
While perhaps such an answer can be justified from a truly 
authentic perspective, it is often just a romantic glorifi­
cation of the "scholarly” way of life. Scholarship, even 
good scholarship, is not ipso facto a meaningful activity.
It can be and often is merely a type of sublimated activity 
which is not substantially different from more "common” 
pursuits. The question, therefore, as to why it is worth­
while to read Dostoevsky has to be answered on a different 
plane than one which claims to derivepleasuiE and curiosity from 
impassioned scholarship. An author, such as Dostoevsky, who
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promulgates with fire the need for authentic living, must 
be confronted on his own terms. It does not matter that at 
times his writing may have been overzealous, bigoted, abso­
lutist, or parochial; for one must still confront him directly 
in order to come to a proper understanding of his works.
Nor should one worry about the degree of authenticity
of Dostoevsky*s own life. It is virtually impossible to
judge or perceive the soul of any man through his works
alone even when that man's work seeks to reach us on an
authentic plane of existence. While this may appear paro-
doxical, it really is not; it is always possible to write
from memory alone. One can even be close to true being,
be aware of it in an extraordinarily clear way, yet live
2
what amounts to an objectified life in the It-world. It 
is for this reason that it is virtually hopeless, if not en­
tirely irrelevant, to question whether the man Fyodor Dos­
toevsky was in fact the authentic man of vision represented 
in his works. Beside the fact that we can never know the
soul of a man, except possibly in direct relation with him
.3
(in Buber’s sense of the word), it is not important to know 
such an intimate fact when confronting his perception of 
truthful being, for it is his ideas, his claim to the truth, 
that we as human beings must confront and resolve. In other 
words, our responsibility lies not in our creating the true 
biography of Fyodor Dostoevsky, but in creating and judging 
our own "biography11 through the confrontation with ideas 
that claim to speak about absolute meaning and truth.
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When answering the question about the importance or rele­
vance of reading Dostoevsky, knowing tiiat the time spent will hardly 
help advance one within the superstructure of the busy and 
hectic modern world, one gives the answer that applies to 
all great philosophers, theologians, artists and poets, 
i.e., one should read Dostoevsky in order to confront the 
issues of a meaningful life.
But how specifically does Dostoevsky speak to us, that 
is, what do his ideas say to us; in what way do they confront 
our being to make us turn away from a hectic, frenzied, ri­
diculous, and often hateful way of life? Does he in fact 
speak to the unridiculous man in us all, the man of quiet 
and clear-sightedness, the man of vision?
It is true that when looking at his philosophy in its 
totality, one feels oppressed by the idea of actually inter­
nalizing the whole of it. Certainly his ideas on Russian 
nationalism and his ideas on creating, through conquest, an 
Orthodox bastion against the rest of the world are too sub­
jective and extreme to be taken seriously. Nevertheless, 
this does not preclude taking seriously his concern about 
man's search for purpose and meaning in life. He believed 
that man would never find true peace until he learned how 
to accept responsibility for his own and others' inability 
to confront the Holy in existence. Through an existential 
love of self and others, achieved through a cultivation of 
Christian humility, man.will find God and, subsequently
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a justification for all existence. God becomes the ultimate 
and only justification for a meaningful existence, without 
Whom all will dissipate into various idolatrous forms of 
sublimated nihilism, a reflection of that fear which Dos­
toevsky and Nietzsche saw, along with the modern existentialists, 
buried so deeply in man--the fear of the void. Dostoevsky 
tried to forestall the atheistic movement of his times, 
which included not only the rejection of God, but the de­
nial of any kind of transcendent reality. With this denial 
he feared not just the loss of man's contact with the true 
and. the Holy, but also the resulting political and psycho­
logical cataclysms that would occur when man began trying 
to fill that void which was sure to follow.
i Man is the being who seeks meaning; yet at the root of 
his everyday psyche, or that aspect of the self disconnected / 
from the true ground of being, is an anxiety and restless­
ness which hints at its own incompleteness. Once any trans­
cendent sense of the Holy is denied, man seeks refuge in 
the Xt-world, or the world of objects, in order to escape 
the perceived void. Dostoevsky interpreted certain types 
of political movements as indicative of such an existen­
tial fear. The antagonists of both The Possessed and The 
Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, as I have shown, played on 
this sense of fear in order to pursue their own particular 
brand of nihilism. In interpreting,the types of mass reac­
tion that cculd occur once all transcendent meaning was 
existentially denied (even if not linguistically denied)y 
Dostoevsky’s works were prophetic for the twentieth century,
as the occasional "success" of fascist regimes indicates. 
His two antichrist characters, Verkhovensky and the Inqui­
sitor, attempted to replace God by falsifying man's sense 
of mystery through the creation of an awe inspiring charis 
matic figure. Although their success or failure depended 
in part on their ability to.deceive, it depended more on 
their "constituents'11 own sense of being. It would be 
wrong to assume that Dostoevsky would have considered man' 
acceptance of such "leaders" merely a result of treacherou 
trickery. Rather, man becomes susceptible to such traps 
through his own denial of the transcendent presence and 
it is his own lack of courage in the face of such a denial 
which makes him seek escape from his new found "freedom." 
In other words, man becomes a dupe to charismatic figures 
when he has lost his sense of relation with God and yet is 
unable to accept a world without Him; as a result, he is 
willing to become a political and spiritual slave in order 
to create new meaning in his life.
Dostoevsky also realized that the search for charis­
matic leaders would not be the only political form by 
which man would seek to relieve himself of the. emptiness 
of his self-created void. Dostoevsky's critique of poli- 
ti-cal ideologies reveals how intellectual systems can also 
perform a similar function. Just as faith in a charisma­
tic leader serves to define one's sense of meaning and 
predetermine one's actions, so does faith in a system of 
Ideas. Dostoevsky critiqued the content of the various
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atheist-socialist, ideologies and also accused them of bad 
faith even in relation to their own stated world view. Not 
only did he view their rejection of God in favor of crass 
materialism as ridiculous, but he believed they ignored the 
existential implications of their own philosophy. Rather 
than realizing the moral vacuum that would be created once 
materialism was accepted as a philosophy, they sought com­
fort in it as a dogmatic guideline for living. Dostoevsky 
would have agreed with Nietzsche's ironical dictum in ref­
erence to such Ideologues: "man would sooner have the void
for purpose, than be void of purpose."
Dostoevsky's .critique of Ideological systems and the tyrannical, 
Godless, charismatic leader obviously speaks to man in the 
twentieth century. It is a century characterized by a pro­
liferation of extremist political movements of both the ideo­
logical and charismatic type, and by its marked turn toward 
a belief in materialist philosophies. To Dostoevsky, such 
phenomena were a sign of man's lack of connectedness with 
his universe. Man's fanatical response becomes more intense 
as his sense of hopelessness becomes more profound. But the 
twentieth century has also created a variation of these types 
of phenomena that Dostoevsky did not foresee, but which is, nevertheless, 
a reflection of the same sense of emptiness and meaninglessness. Robert 
Lifton has made the point that along with the loss of bound­
aries due to the breakdown of traditional beliefs, images, 
and ideas, the advent of the mass media has transformed modem man into 
a being who is an ever changing "protean man.1 Modem man, Lifton sug- 
gests, has the tendency to thrust himself into successive,
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often contradictory roles with which he is able to identify almost im­
plicitly. Protean man differs from nineteenth century man in that he 
is faced with a continual bombardment of various images which causes 
him to shift and countershift his ideological and psychological identi­
fication. Although Lifton appears sympathetic to the idea of protean 
man, this author views his perceptive diagnosis of twentieth century 
man as a further indication of the tendency of man to ■ seek refuge in 
ideological certainty in the absence of his ability to seek true rela­
tion. Protean man's committments are temporary, but deeply passionate 
and searching. He is symptomatic of man’s disconnection and fear of 
the void; he is adrift, but desperately seeks meaning.
Although Dostoevsky focused his critique of man’s spiritual denial 
of himself, his fellow man, nature, and God, primarily in terms of 
ideological and charismatic political movements, he would not have con­
sidered such responses as the only mode of denial. This is mentioned 
primarily because the modern industrial West, especially 
America, often praises itself for its relative lack of poli­
tical extremism (forgetting, somehow, two world wars, two 
Asian wars, an extended cold war, and an inconceivable 
proliferation of nuclear weapons). Western industrial man 
will pride himself on his belief in a "pragmatism'1 which 
has produced the highest standard of living in history.
He has defined meaning in terms of his ability to progress 
toward the creation of bigger and better material conveni­
ences . While his way of life may not be characterized as 
highly ideological, it is characterized by an extreme form 
of possessive individualism. Although perceiving himself 1
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as having transcended all ideological considerations, modern 
Western man has, nevertheless, trapped himself in the objec­
tified It-world as much as any political fanatic. The fa­
natic objectifies the world by making certain narrow poli­
tical goals, ideas or commands absolute; the possessive 
individual objectifies the world through the continual 
thrust toward acquisition. The compulsive pursuit of plea­
sures, possessions and security is, like the political fa­
natics’ search for certainty, the result of a sublimated 
anxiety, at its root irrational and escapist, even if jus­
tified in so-called pragmatic terms. It too reflects a 
loss of God and a subsequent sense of the void.
Dostoevsky’s thought attempts to counter the effects 
of nihilistic political movements and the philosophy of 
possessive individualism. He attempts to give a psycho-
t
religious interpretation of such phenomena and to offer a 
truer form of being. He speaks to all men who find them­
selves feeling trapped, unwhole, and who at bottom sense 
the possibility of a fuller realization of self and other.
He states his conviction that man is capable of beholding 
a truer vision of the world. He calls for man to enter in­
to existential relation with the world, rather than trying 
merely to categorize, conquer and possess. In the words 
of Martin Buber, he desires all to say Thou to the universe.
He calls for a true solidarity of men and for an existen­
tial relationship with God. His work speaks to us in that 
it tries to present the image of the unified self, present
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always to itself and other*. Once one faces the fear of emp­
tiness, the expected void gives way to the ground of Holy 
Being and to a sense of true solidarity. The character 
Zossima bears witness to this Dostoevskian faith; and through 
Dostoevsky's exhortation to cultivate Christian humility, 
the novelist claims to offer the way to true being.
We conclude by asking once again why one should read 
Dostoevsky and we answer that one should read him because 
in his works there exists the representation of man’s 
struggle with his true destiny, as the portrayal of such 
characters as Stavrogin, Ivan, Alyosha and Zossima indicate.
His work demands that we confront his conception of true 
being-in-the-world and by doing so to confront our own 
spiritual and psychological being, even if our conclusions 
are not always the same as his. Although they are not al­
ways the same, the confrontation of different ideas con­
cerning the meaning of life and death will always result 
in positive effects as long as one is honest to oneself.
All this praise of Dostoevsky’s writings must include 
a warning not to take the works themselves too seriously.
No man's writings are a panacea or an absolute source book 
for truth. The idea of truth, even an accurate representa­
tion of how one can and ought to be is still only an idea, 
i.e., an object of the mind. A great writer can make a man 
look to himself and his world in order to try to grasp the 
meaning of his own life, but no amount of reading, as Dos­
toevsky supremely knew, can be a substitute for personal decision. Each
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person must make the choice "of leaving behind his irra­
tional, enslaved and possessive way of life. He must de­
cide to take a path less worn without fear of losing the 
safety and security of a world of money, prestige or false 
identification. Great art, such as Dostoevsky's, can point 
toward the way, but it is we who must decide whether we 
shall take the road toward a more authentic, moral way 
of life.
134.
MOTES TO CONCLUSION
1
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and The 
Genealogy of Morals, trans. by Francis Golffing (Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956), p. 299.
2
Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. by Ronald Gregor 
Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), see
pp. 3-11 for original introduction to the term.
3
Ibid.
4
Robert Jay Lifton, Boundaries, (New York: Random
House, 1969), pp. 37-63.
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